Improving user experience in StateCraft by Carlson, Christoph Mandler & Hellevang, Mathias
Improving user experience in StateCraft
THESIS
By Christoph Carlson and Mathias Hellevang
Department of Information Science and Media Studies
University of Bergen
Spring 2010
Abstract
User experience is an important aspect of game development, and techniques in Artificial
Intelligence have been proved to increase the agent performance and have the potential to
affect user experience in games. In this thesis, we aim to improve the user experience of
the computer game known as StateCraft by extending the computer controlled opponent
with the Emotion module and the Prisoner’s Dilemma module. We conducted simulations
and user tests to study the effects of these modules on the agent performance and user
experience.
The Emotion module gives the autonomous agent in StateCraft emotions. Existing re-
search shows that emotions affect the decision making of the agent and make it appear
more human-like. Statistic analysis of the simulation data indicates that agents perform
worse in general with emotions than without. Based on the study performed on the user
test of StateCraft with and without the Emotion module, we are not able to make a clear
conclusion on the user experience, but the results indicate that playing against emotional
agents is more fun, hence increases the user experience.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma module gives the autonomous agent in StateCraft an unders-
tanding of the concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. StateCraft contains several situations
similar to the ones expressed in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we wished to study whether
the agent would perform differently if it understood this concept. The module was imple-
mented with two strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma module, Tit-For-Tat and Freidman,
which both modify the behaviour of the agent according to the original specification of the
strategies. Statistic analysis of the simulation data shows that Tit-For-Tat and Freidman
lead to a more balanced game when all the agents are using the same strategy. The results
from the user test with and without the Prisoner’s Dilemma module were ambiguous, and
thus indicate that further research is required to study the effects of these strategies on
user experience.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Ever since the 1970s, when computer games evolved into an industry, they have greatly
influenced Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a research field. Game AI has come a long way
since it took its first wobbling steps, and players have grown to expect more and more
from the computer controlled opponents in a game. A computer controlled opponent is
expected to make good choices, but not too good; the user should eventually be able
to beat it, while at the same time appear human like. User experience is an important
aspect of game development, and techniques in Artificial Intelligence have been proved to
increase the agent performance and have the potential to affect user experience in games.
In their master project, Helgesen and Krzywinski implemented an electronic version of
the multiplayer strategic board game Diplomacy. They named the game StateCraft. In
StateCraft autonomous intelligent agents played as an opponent to human players. Impro-
vements and further development have been carried out after Helgesen and Krzywinski.
For example, Jensen and Nes (2008) implemented a Personality module for the agent and
studied the effect of personality on the agent performance and player experience.
This master project is a further extension of StateCraft which aims at improving the per-
formance and user experience. We implemented two different modules in the autonomous
agent of the game. The modules are the Emotion module and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
module.
1.1 The Emotion module
The Emotion module aims to improve the user experience of the game by giving the
agent internal emotional states based on an emotion model. The emotional states affect
the decisions of the agent, and hopefully make it appear more human-like.
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Emotions have shown to be an important part of the human intelligence, and that they
play an important role in decision-making for human beings. In this thesis, we wish to
study whether an agent equipped with emotions will enhance the user experience. Of
course, many people are sceptical and believe agents with “feelings” to be a futuristic
dream, and maybe they are right. The most complex artificial systems still lag behind the
complexity of an animal such as a squirrel or a nest-building bird (Sloman, 1998). Some
doubters might be driven by the fear of computers taking over the world, like in sci-fi
novels, while others might just dislike the thought of machines having these abilities that
we as humans value so highly. In this thesis, the focus is not on making computers able to
feel consciousness, but rather on simulating emotions in an agent so that it appears more
human-like, with the goal of increasing the player’s game experience.
Earlier research has shown that emotions can be successfully implemented in agents. The
results indicates that emotions can improve both the performance of an agent (Maria and
Zitar, 2007), as well as the believability of the agent, where believability refers to the
agent providing the illusion of life (Bates, 1994).
To decide how to design and implement the Emotion module, a player study was conduc-
ted. Seven players were gathered to play the board game, and four of them were inter-
viewed about their emotions afterwards. The OCC-model (Ortony et al., 1988) combined
with the information collected in the player study formed the foundation for the Emotion
module.
To evaluate the Emotion module, we have defined the following research question:
RQ How does emotions affect the performance of the agent and player experience in
StateCraft?
To answer the research question, we ran a total of 310 data simulations of the game from
1901 to 1911, and compared the performance of the agent with and without emotions,
using statistical analysis. Additionally, we performed a series of user evaluations, where
six participants were asked to play three games. In the first game they were asked to
identify the agents’ emotions. Then the participants played two more games, one against
emotional agents and one against regular agents. Afterwards, they were asked to state
their opinions on which game they preferred.
The intention of this module is to study whether or not giving the agent emotions will
enhance the user experience; improve the performance of the agent.
1.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma module
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) module is implemented to give the agent an understanding
of the classical game theory problem of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. StateCraft contains
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several situations similar to the ones expressed in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and because
of this, we wish to study whether the agent will perform differently if it understands the
concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
StateCraft in all its complexity contains several situations akin to those present in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game used to describe
the problem of cooperation versus defection among rational actors in an environment
where the actors will not necessarily gain directly from cooperating with each other. In
StateCraft the players are competing for world domination, where supply centers1 are the
resources all players are fighting over.
Earlier research has resulted in several strategies for maximizing the outcome of the Pri-
soner’s Dilemma. In this thesis we have implemented two of these strategies, where one,
Tit-For-Tat, has proven to be successful in a two-player Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game2
(Axelrod, 2006), while the other, Freidman, has shown great potential in a three-player
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Matsushima and Ikegami, 1998). Consequently, we
wished to study the effect of these strategies in n-player game such as StateCraft.
To evaluate the Prisoner’s Dilemma module, we have defined the following research ques-
tion:
RQ How does the PD strategies affect the performance of the agent and player experience
in StateCraft?
There are several aspects of performance for the Prisoner’s Dilemma module. The num-
ber of supply centers the agent is able to gain is maybe the most obvious, and can be
interpreted as a direct indicator of the agent’s performance in the game. Another aspect
important for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is the score, a quantitative unit of measurement
used to evaluate how good a player performs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The score will
be further defined in chapter 2. Last but not least, there is the human interpretation of
agent performance, that is, how users think the agent performs, and why.
To shed some light on these aspects, we have performed qualitative data collections by
letting users play the game with and without the Prisoner’s Dilemma module, which we
then use to explore whether or not the Prisoner’s Dilemma have any effect on the user
experience of the game. We have also collected quantitative data from StateCraft by
running 430 simulations of the game from 1901 to 1911. This data will be subject to
statistical analysis with the goal of exploring whether the Prisoner’s Dilemma module has
any effect on the game in terms of supply centers and score.
1Supply centers are explained in detail in Section 3.2
2An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with several iterations. The
players will fight each other N times, where N > 1.
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The intention of this module is to study whether or not giving the agent these capabilities
will enhance the user experience; improve the performance of the agent; and last but not
least, to see if classical strategies used for the two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma will work in
the n-player domain of StateCraft.
1.3 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter two presents a theoretical background for both
emotions in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, used as a basis for the
development and evaluation of the modules. Chapter three contains general information
about the board game Diplomacy and StateCraft, as well as information about lower-layer
improvements we have made to StateCraft to facilitate the development of the Emotion
and Prisoner’s Dilemma modules. Chapter four gives a detailed walk-through of the design
and implementation of the two modules, while the two modules are evaluated in chapter
five and six. Chapter seven presents the conclusion of the thesis, as well as proposals for
future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 About this chapter
In this chapter we present artificial intelligence, emotions and different ways of repre-
senting them, as well as earlier research combining emotions and artificial intelligence.
In addition to this, we present the Prisoner’s Dilemma, discuss the difference between
2-player, 3-player and n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, and give an overview of different
strategies used for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
2.2 Artificial intelligence
Most people have an idea of what artificial intelligence (AI) is, mainly because of the in-
fluence from popular culture. Movies such as“2001: A Space Odyssey”(1968), “Star Wars”
(1977), “WarGames” (1983), “Terminator” (1984), “Artificial Intelligence: AI” (2001) and
“I, Robot” (2004) all contain some sort of entities with artificial intelligence. The com-
mon denominator for these movies is that they all present complex entities with a vast
intelligence, often in the form of humanoids (e.g. Terminator and I, Robot), and they all
possess what can be characterized as a personality and, to some extent, emotions. Such
movies might have created a public perception of AI that does not correspond with the
harsh realities of AI research.
Artificial intelligence is quite new as a research field, but myths and stories tell us that
mankind has been fascinated by the concept of autonomous “machines” for thousands
of years. According to Greek myths, the God of Hephaestus made Talos, a man made
of bronze. Talos was to patrol the beaches of Crete, protecting Europa from pirates and
invaders (Russell and Norvig, 2003, p. 939). Looking past myths and mythology, Ktesibios
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of Alexandria built the first known self-controlling machine about 250 years B.C. (Russell
and Norvig, 2003, p. 15). This was a water clock, known as a clepsydra, designed to
control the water flow at a constant pace by utilising a regulator. This represented a
paradigm shift from looking at objects as static artifacts, to looking at them as dynamic
entities able to modify their behaviour based on their environment.
However, that an artifact is able to respond to the environment is not necessarily enough
for it to be characterised as an intelligent machine. Philosophers early assumed that to
create intelligent machines, one first had to understand and identify human intelligence.
Beginning as early as Ancient Greece, philosophers, such as Aristotle, have tried to des-
cribe human thinking as the mechanical manipulation of symbols (Russell and Norvig,
2003, p. 6). This way of thinking, combined with the idea of self-controlling machines,
laid the foundation for the modern programmable computer and artificial intelligence.
Inspired by the programmable computer, artificial intelligence was founded as a research
field at a conference at Dartmouth College in 1956 (Russell and Norvig, 2003, p. 17). The
interest in AI rapidly grew and people quickly gained high expectations for the field.
There are numerous definitions of AI. McCarthy (2007), who originally coined the term
artificial intelligence, defines it as “the science and engineering of making intelligent ma-
chines”. Luger (2004, p. 1) describes it quite similarly as “[...] the branch of computer
science that is concerned with the automation of intelligent behavior”.
Due to the numerous applications of AI, it has over the years evolved into several sub-
disciplines, each with a different focus or goal. Luger (2004, p. 20-28) lists“Game Playing,
Automated Reasoning and Theorem Proving, Expert Systems, Natural Language Unders-
tanding and Semantic Modelling, Modelling Human Performance, Planning and Robotics,
and Machine Learning”as examples of such disciplines. Game playing is the most relevant
sub-discipline for this thesis, and will therefore be the main focus of this chapter.
2.3 AI in Games
Game AI took its first wobbling steps in the early 1950’s, when Christopher Strachey
wrote a checkers program for the Ferranti Mark I computer, at the Manchester Computing
Machine Laboratory. By 1952, Strachey claimed that the program could “play a complete
game of draughts at a reasonable speed” (Copeland, 2000). During the 1950’s and 1960’s,
a few researchers attempted to create video games with or without AI, but games as an
industry first developed in the 1970’s.
In 1971, Nutting Associates released Computer Space, the worlds first commercially avai-
lable arcade game. Although it is questionable whether the player’s computer controlled
opponent was intelligent enough to fit the description of “artificial intelligence”, the com-
mercialisation of video games created a new incentive for people to research game AI.
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Figure 2.1: AI in computer games
(Woodcock, 2000)
By 1972, Pong was released by Atari. Primitive as it may have been, it was the first
game gaining widespread success. The 70’s and 80’s created such titles as Space Invaders,
Pacman, Zork, King’s Quest and Donkey Kong.
Today, computer games generate big revenues. In 2001, the US computer game industry
had a business volume larger than that of the US film industry (Kleiner, 2005). Artificial
intelligence is becoming more and more important for video games, and human players
are expecting the opponent to perform in a human-like manner. As a result of this, we
can observe that the CPU resources used to process AI have grown considerably since
the beginning, and the number of projects where one or more developers are dedicated
to working on AI has increased significantly (see Figure2.1). Kleiner (2005) argues that
the development in AI needs seen in later years might grow to be so large that it will
enforce the development of specialised hardware for AI, as we have seen with for instance
graphics accelerators or even physics accelerators. However, Tozour (2008) argue that
such hardware will never surface, among other reasons because the problems faced when
developing AI for games are too varied to make good use of such hardware.
In 1997, the chess-playing computer Deep Blue beat the reigning world champion Garry
Kasparov in a game of Chess. What was remarkable about this is that Deep Blue derived
most of its power by using brute force algorithms. This demonstrates how a computer,
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albeit a supercomputer,1 was able to beat the leading player at the time using a data driven
approach to AI, analysing 10-12 levels ahead, calculating all possible moves, something
which amounts to an incredible 1 000 000 000 000 000 000 different positions (Newborn,
2003).
In other board games like Checkers, Scrabble and Othello, computers also make some of
the best players in the world. What’s similar for all these games is that they are board
games, with a finite number of potential moves in a round. This makes it theoretically
possible to calculate all the possible moves with raw computational power, and for simple
games like Tic-Tac-Toe, this has already happened.
2.4 Emotions
In this section, we will discuss what emotions are, if there are any basic emotions and
why one would want to create emotional agents. We will also look at two models for
emotion synthesis and other implementations of emotional agents. Last, we will discuss
how emotions affect decision-making and behaviour.
2.4.1 What are emotions?
What is an emotion? People use emotions to describe their internal states and a person
can easily recognise emotions like sadness, but that does not mean that they know how
it works in detail. It is difficult to define an emotion, and Sloman (1993) suggested that
we must wait for deeper theories about the underlying mechanisms before we can hope to
come up with a precise definition of the phenomena, just like we for example had to gain
greater understanding about chemistry before we could form a good definition salt.
Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981, p. 355) reviewed over 100 different definitions of emo-
tions and proposed the following:
Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective and objective fac-
tors, mediated by neural˜hormonal systems, which can (a) give rise to affec-
tive experiences such as feelings of arousal, pleasure/displeasure; (b) generate
cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant perceptual effects, appraisals,
labeling processes; (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the
arousing conditions; and (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always,
expressive, goaldirected, and adaptive.
1At the time, the worlds 259th most powerful supercomputer
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Their definition might be too wide for our use, so when we speak of emotions in this
thesis, we refer to the definition from Ortony et al. (1988, p. 13):
[...] valenced reactions to events, agents, or objects, with their particular nature
being determined by the way in which the eliciting situation is construed.
2.4.2 Basic emotions
Most emotion theorists agree that some emotions are more basic than others, often cal-
led primary or fundamental emotions. In colour vision, which many theorists use as a
metaphor for emotions, it was a great help to come up with the three basic irreducible
colours; red, blue and green. Emotion theorists also try to find these basic, irreducible
emotions. However, none of them seem to agree on which emotions are basic, why they
are basic or how many basic emotions there are. Mowrer (1960) claims that the only two
basic emotions are pleasure and pain, while other theorists, such as Frijda (1987) claim
that there are as many as 18 basic emotions.
Some claim that, in order to be referred to as a basic emotion, an emotion should have its
own distinct facial expression across cultures. However, there are many things we do not
consider emotions that has its own facial expression across cultures (e.g. lifting a heavy
object). Also, an extremely intense feeling of joy might lead to crying, which also would
be the facial expression associated with sadness. Does this mean that sadness should not
be considered an emotion? Ortony and Turner (1990) argue that perhaps the only basic
emotions are those that are experienced by both humans and animals. For example, it is
easy to see that fear and anger are being experienced by a monkey or dog, but how is it
possible to know if a monkey or dog experiences emotions such as envy or shame? One
could argue that fear and anger are more basic since it is more plausible that animals also
experience these emotions.
The most frequently occurring basic emotions among emotion theorists are anger, happi-
ness, sadness and fear. However, these emotions also seem to be the emotions that are
most frequently referred to in Western culture (Conway and Bekerian, 1987), and this
might bias some theorists into giving these emotions a special status. There is also a
possibility that a phenomenon such as basic emotions does not exist. Ortony and Turner
(1990, p. 329), after a long review on basic emotions, concluded that “[...] the study of
emotions is no more dependent on the existence of a nontrivial subset of basic emotions in
terms of which all other emotions can be explained than is the study of language dependent
on the existence of a small subset of elemental languages, or the study of animals on a
set of basic animals”.
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2.4.3 Why emotional agents?
Emotions have shown to be an important part of human intelligence which plays an
important role in decision-making for most humans. Even though emotions and rationa-
lity/reasoning might seem contradictory, neurological evidence show that they are more
connected than first thought (Damasio, 1994). A study performed on a patient called
’Elliot’, who had a brain damage that made him unable of experiencing normal human
emotions, shed new light on the link between emotion and decision-making. One would
think that this brain damage would make him operate highly rational, but the study
showed that he had difficulties performing rational tasks like getting dressed in the mor-
ning (Damasio, 1994). Damasio (1994) suggested that Elliot’s cold-blooded reasoning
might have prevented him from assigning values to the different options, which made his
decision-making landscape hopelessly flat. In other words, emotion can be considered an
important part of human intelligence:
“The question is not whether intelligent machines can have any emotions, but
whether machines can be intelligent without any emotions” (Minsky, 1988)
Many researchers think that emotions are part of the reason why humans are excellent
at making decisions on small data sets in environments with much uncertainty, often
called “acting on a gut-feeling”. By assuming this, one could argue that emotions could
be useful from an engineering perspective, with the main focus on increasing system
performance. Some implementations have shown that emotions can help agents make
better decisions, for example Maria and Zitar (2007) who showed that an agent with
emotions performed better than a regular agent in a benchmark problem. Their research
indicated that emotions can be performance enhancing if used correctly.
From a scientific perspective, implementations of emotional agents can be used as a test
bed for theories about natural emotions in animals and humans. Emotional agents can
also be used in the field of Human-Computer-Interaction as a tool to reason about how
the user feels and thereby improve usability and acceptance, e.g. a personal agent should
not ask the user the same question many times if it feels that it annoys the user. But
most relevant to this thesis, emotional agents can be used in computer games, to create
a more human-like opponent, making it more fun to play against.
Animators have known for a long time that one of the keys to create a believable character
is to give the character the ability to express emotion in a clear manner with appropriate
timing. Two of Disney’s core animators, Thomas and Johnson, stated that: “From the
earliest days, it has been the portrayal of emotions that has given the Disney characters
the illusion of life” (Thomas and Johnson in Bates, 1994, p. 2).
AI researchers, on the other hand, have been focusing more on reasoning, problem solving
and other characteristics which we associate with intelligence, on their path to solve
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the riddle of human-like agents. The reason for this might be that such characteristics
are highly valued by scientists and research communities. Bates (1994) argues that while
scientists may have been able to recreate the scientist, animation artists have come closest
to understanding and capturing the essence of humanity that many AI researchers seek.
2.4.4 Synthesising emotions
For an agent to“have”emotions, it needs the ability to synthesise or generate them. There
are several theories on how emotions are generated, but the OCC-model (Ortony et al.,
1988) and the three-layered architecture by Sloman (1993) were considered most relevant
since they were made with computation in mind.
2.4.4.1 The Ortony Clore Collins-model (OCC)
The OCC model (Ortony et al., 1988) focuses on what contribution cognition makes to
emotion, and devotes less time to other important aspects such as facial expressions or
behavioural components. Nor does it focus on how different emotions interact with each
other. To this day, it is one of the most popular models for synthesising emotions, despite
the fact that it was never intended for that purpose. Ortony et al. (1988) thought it was
important for a machine to reason about emotions, not to have them. They did not try to
describe every different emotion, but work at a higher level, called emotional clusters or
emotional types. For example, the emotion joy in the OCC-model also includes emotions
like happiness, cheerfulness and bliss.
The OCC-model puts emotions into 22 categories, as seen in Figure 2.2, depending on if
they are appraisals to events, actions of agents or objects, giving these emotions different
emotion words. Ortony et al. (1988, p. 21) specify that these words are just chosen as
suggestive labels for entries for that position in the structure and that their structure are
not intended to be used to define these words.
In the OCC-model, emotion was described as a valenced reaction to an event, agent or
an object. Valenced means that the emotion has to get a positive or negative reaction,
excluding neutral emotions such as surprise. The emotion’s particular nature is being
determined by the construal of the eliciting situation. For example, take two people
watching a soccer game when one of the teams scores. The first person cheers for the
scoring team, while the other person cheers for the other team. The first person will
probably feel joy, since his team just scored. However, the other person may feel distress,
since he was unappeased with the event. The event is the exact same for both persons,
but their construals of the event is different (Ortony et al., 1988, p. 4).
Events are considered things that happen, and the agent’s reaction depends on his goals.
Given that the main goal of the agent in StateCraft is to gain 18 provinces, losing a
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Figure 2.2: The original OCC-model
(Picard, 2000)
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province would be displeasing to him, and thereby cause him distress. The prospect
of future events can give rise to the prospect-based emotions hope and fear, and the
intensity also depends on the goals. If the agent thought it was likely that a neighbour
would attack it and conquer its provinces (i.e. a displeasing event), he might experience
fear. The intensity of the emotion also depends on the likelihood of him attacking.
Actions of agents can be approved or disapproved depending on the agent’s set of stan-
dards. If it is another agent who performs the action, it can give rise to the emotions
admiration and reproach. If it is the agent itself who carries out the action, the emotion
pride or shame might occur. Standards represent both moral and beliefs, for example
“One shall not lie to other people”. When an agent lies to another player (e.g. about
supporting someone in an attack on Burgundy) it will disapprove of its own action, and
therefore feel shame if the intensity of the emotion is strong enough.
Objects can be disliked or liked based on the agent’s attitudes towards the object. An
object can also be another agent. An attitude can be “I don’t like people who wear gold
chains”. The intensity of these emotions are mostly based on the grade of “dislike” or
“like” towards the object.
Last but not least, there are compound emotions consisting of two other emotions. For
example an agent will feel reproach towards another agent who attacked him, and distress
since he lost a province. This combination will lead to anger towards the other agent,
which is stronger in intensity than the two others and thereby will overwhelm them.
Let’s look at a simple example of how the OCC-model’s implementable rules can easily
be used to synthesise the emotion joy.
Rule 1:
IF DESIRE (p, e, t) > 0
THEN set JOY-POTENTIAL (p, e, t) =
fj(| DESIRE (p, e, t) |, Ig (p, e, t))
DESIRE (p, e, t) is a function that returns the desirability that a person p assigns to
some event e at a time t. If it returns a positive number, it is a desirable event for the
person p, and therefore will cause joy. However, in the case of an undesirable event, it
will return a negative number and might also cause distress. Ig is a function that returns
the combined effects of all the global intensity variables. Fjis a function specific to joy,
that takes the desirability and the effects of global intensity as parameters (Ortony et al.,
1988, p.183).
A crucial component that is presented in the OCC-model is that an emotion’s intensity
has to be above a certain threshold value. If the value is below the threshold value, the
emotion will not be experienced by the person. Therefore we will need rules such as Rule
2:
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Rule 2:
IF JOY-POTENTIAL (p, e, t) > JOY-THRESHOLD (p, t)
THEN set JOY-INTENSITY (p, e, t) =
JOY-POTENTIAL (p, e, t) - JOY-THRESHOLD (p, t)
ELSE set JOY-INTENSITY (p, e, t) = 0
Example: Frank is watching a funny movie, but he is not feeling joyful. The setting may
imply that he should be feeling joyful, but the JOY-POTENTIAL does not exceed the
JOY-THRESHOLD, meaning that he feels no joy.
2.4.4.2 Three-Layered Architecture
In 1998, Aaron Sloman proposed a three-layer architecture for human emotions, where the
layers can be categorised by their evolutionary age, from oldest to newest. The first layer
consists of purely reactive emotions, also known as primary emotions, and is considered
the oldest layer. These emotions are found in all animals, even insects. However, animals
with only a reactive layer will probably have a very predictable behaviour, for example
running every time it sees light. Emotions found in this layer are terrified and disgust
(Sloman, 1998).
The second layer consists of the more recently evolved deliberative emotions found in
some animals. Emotions such as relief, apprehension and anxiousness belong to this
layer. The deliberative layer performs tasks such as planning, decision-making, success
detection and resource allocation. An example can be a person who discovers he passed
his driver’s license. After being nervous for some time, he will detect his success and most
likely transition into the feeling of relief (Sloman, 1998).
The third layer is called the meta-management or self-monitoring layer and is the most
recently evolved layer. It is likely that this layer only exists in primates, and very young
human infants do not seem to have it fully developed. Examples of emotions found in
this layer are shame, grief, infatuation and embarassment. One of the interesting points
about this layer is perturbance, meaning that an emotion makes one lose control over ones
thoughts, and thoughts unwillingly interrupt one’s attention. For example, if a father has
lost his son in a car accident, the grief will probably be so intense that he will have
problems focusing his mind on anything else (Sloman, 1998).
This architecture lacks implementation details, but sheds light on the need for a layered
architecture, which includes low-level primitive emotions as well as high-level cognitive
ones. But above all, it shows that there is a need for a layer for meta-management or self-
control, so that the system is able to manage its emotions. According to Picard (2000),
this is not only important, but also necessary for a system whose purpose is to develop
the skills of emotional intelligence for regulating and using its emotions wisely.
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2.4.5 Emotion’s affect on behaviour and decision-making
When the emotions have been generated internally in the agent, it needs to act on its
emotions. Since facial expressions are not relevant to this thesis, we will focus on how
emotions influence behaviour and decision-making.
Emotion plays two interesting roles in decision-making: expected emotion and immediate
emotion. Expected emotion consists of the predictions about emotional consequences of
decisions. For example, a person might think through all the different possible outcomes
and assign an expected emotion to each outcome, based on prior experiences. Immediate
emotions are the emotions felt at the time of the decision-making. “Immediate emotions
can influence decisions indirectly by altering the decision maker’s perceptions of probabili-
ties or outcomes or by altering the quality and quantity of processing of decision-relevant
cues” (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003, p. 620).
Several studies have been performed on the effect on decision-making of specific emotions
such as anger, guilt and fear. Lerner and Keltner (2001) found that angry and happy
decision-makers make optimistic risk estimates and more risk-seeking choices, while fearful
people express more pessimistic risk-estimates and tend to make the safe choice. Another
well documented effect of anger is aggression (Berkowitz, 1990), but studies have shown
that it is hard to focus it towards the person one is angry at (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).
On the other hand, Harmon-Jones et al. (2003) found that anger makes people more eager
to act if there is something that can be done to resolve the negative situation. Freedman
et al. (1967) discovered that people who are feeling guilty are easier to manipulate into
complying, at least when they have the possibility of avoiding a confrontation with the
one towards which they are feeling guilty.
2.4.6 Implementations of emotional agents
In this subsection, we will look at some implementations of emotional agents and how the
emotions were used to affect facial expressions and decisions.
2.4.6.1 The Orphanage-Care project
Maria and Zitar (2007) used a simplified version of the OCC-model to create an emotional
agent. The emotions are generated by a symbolic approach which utilises a rule-based
system with interactions with the environment and an internal “thinking” mechanism.
They also made an agent without emotions, and compared the two agents by letting them
solve a benchmark problem called the “The Orphanage Care Project”. The purpose was
to show that systems with a proper model of emotions can, in many cases, perform better
than the same system without the emotion model, and their test results showed that this
was the case.
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Figure 2.3: An Extended Intelligent Agent Framework
(El-Nasr and Skubic, 1998)
2.4.6.2 A Fuzzy Emotional Mobile Robot
El-Nasr and Skubic (1998) researched the utility value of emotions for decision-making
in a mobile robot. They used a fuzzy logic model to represent the intensity of the three
emotions; anger, fear and pain. The reason for choosing a fuzzy logic model is that an
emotion is not either on or off, it can vary in intensity. For example one can feel mild
anger or one can feel wild rage. The framework in use is an expansion of the Intelligent
Agent (IA) framework presented by Russell and Norvig (2003).
As shown in Figure 2.3, expectations are important for calculating the intensity of the
emotions. If a person believes he will receive an A on his test, but receives an F, he will
probably feel sad and disappointed. If he feels that the teacher is to blame, he may also
feel anger towards the teacher. The person’s goals also affect the emotion generation. If
his goal was to get a bad grade, he would not feel the same emotions. Another interesting
aspect of their algorithm is that emotions are suppressed if their intensity is below a
certain threshold. The threshold depends on for example the number of people nearby. If
the robot is surrounded by many people, it will suppress feelings of mild anger.
2.4.6.3 The Oz project
Bates (1994) and his research partner Scott Neal Reilly were interested in making be-
lievable agents, so they created a fictional world, called “The Oz Project”. It consists
of several fictional characters that do not look like any real creatures, but are built to
influence their audience as they were. The key to making believable characters were,
inspired by Disney animators, to create characters with clearly defined emotional states.
The characters generate emotions by using cognitive appraisals to the world with a sys-
tem called Em. Em is based on the OCC model, with two extra emotions: startle and
frustration. Each emotion has an intensity threshold, which the intensity has to exceed in
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order to affect the characters outward behaviour. Each emotion’s intensity also descends
towards zero as time goes by. The mood of the character is defined as the sum of all
negative and positive emotions. If the intensity of the positive emotions is larger than
the intensity of all negative emotions, the character is in a good mood, and vice versa. In
addition, the creatures are equipped with a personality, which also affect their outward
behaviour.
2.4.6.4 Poker-playing agent with facial expressions
Koda and Maes (1996) developed a personified poker-playing agent with facial expressions.
The agent uses a subset of the emotions presented in the OCC model, extended with the
emotion surprise, for emotion synthesis. These emotions are then used to affect the facial
expressions of the agent, for example, if the agent feels sad, they will show the image where
the player has a sad facial expression. They concluded that people found the poker agents
with facial expressions more likable, engaging and comfortable than the ones without.
However, the users did not perceive the agents with facial expressions as more intelligent
than those without. To be perceived as intelligent, it seems that the agent’s actual skill
at poker is the major factor.
2.5 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
2.5.1 What is the Prisoner’s dilemma?
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a well-known problem in the field of game theory. It’s a
non-zero-sum game used to describe the problem of cooperation vs. defection among
rational actors in an environment where the actors will not necessarily gain directly from
cooperating with each other. Axelrod (2006, p. 9) describes it as an “abstract formulation
of some very common and very interesting situations in which what is best for each person
individually leads to mutual defections, whereas everyone would have been better off with
mutual cooperation”. It is defined as follows:
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, two individuals can each either cooperate or
defect. The payoff to a player is in terms of the effect on its fitness (survival
and fecundity). No matter what the other does, the selfish choice of defection
yields a higher payoff than cooperation. But if both defect, both do worse than
if both had cooperated (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, p. 1391).
As the name implies, PD is formalised as a scenario set to a prison of some sort. Two
prisoners (the players) are arrested for some crime, e.g. a bank robbery, and put into
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Table 2.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R = 3, R = 3 S = 0, T = 5
Defect T = 5, S = 0 P = 1, P = 1
Where T stands for Temptation to defect, R for Reward for mutual cooperation, P for
Punishment for mutual defection and S for Sucker’s payoff. To be defined as a Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the following inequalities must hold: T > R > P > S.
interrogation rooms. The police do not have sufficient evidence to tie the prisoners to the
robbery, but strongly suspect both prisoners to be guilty. What they do have is enough
evidence to send the prisoners to jail for a short period of time for some other crime (this
is, after all, rather ruthless criminals), for example petty theft, i.e. a lesser crime. The
police do not want to jail them for this lesser crime, instead, they want to jail them for
the big crime. So they try to get the prisoners to talk, stating that if one of the prisoners
P1 give enough information to jail the other prisoners P2, P1 will go free, while P2 will
receive a maximum sentence. If both the prisoners give information about each other,
they will both receive a medium sentence. If none of the prisoners give any information
to the police, they will both receive the minimum sentence for whatever other crime they
have committed (the petty theft).
The act of talking or giving information about the other prisoner to the police is defined
as defecting, while the act of remaining silent is defined as cooperating (with the
other prisoner). None of the prisoners care about their accomplice, they only care about
their own personal gain, and as such the choice of defecting by testifying against their
accomplice is tempting. However, they risk serving a very long sentence if they both
testify against each other, but - not as long as the sentence the loosing part serves if only
one of them testifies against the other. Axelrod (2006, p. 9) argues that the best choice
for a player P1 is to defect if he thinks the other player P2 will cooperate, and that the
best choice for a player P1 is to defect if he thinks the other player P2 will defect. So,
the best choice for a player P1 is to defect if P2 will cooperate and if P2 will defect.
However, this is true for P2 as well, so P2 should defect no matter what the first player
does. The dilemma is derived from the fact that if both of them defects, they will both
receive the medium sentence, which is considerably worse than the minimum sentence
they could receive if they both cooperated!
See Table 2.1 for a more structured, weighted description of the dilemma.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not meant to be interpreted as a dilemma between two priso-
ners. The dilemma they face, albeit most likely very important for the prisoners, probably
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isn’t very interesting from a scientific point of view2. Axelrod applies the dilemma to such
cases as the “live-and-let-live” system that emerged during World War I, where the two
fighting forces (the Allies and the Central Powers, respectively) had soldiers stationed in
trenches along the Western Front for long periods of time. During the course of the war,
the soldiers of both sides developed a system of mutual cooperation, where the soldiers on
the allied side would refrain from inflicting damage to the soldiers fighting for the central
powers, and vice versa, the soldiers fighting for the central powers would be hesitant to
administer what they considered needless violence to the allied soldiers (Axelrod, 2006,
p. 73-74).
The real reason for the quietness of some sections of the line was that neither
side had any intention of advancing in that particular district... If the British
shelled the Germans, the Germans replied, and the damage was equal: if the
Germans bombed an advanced piece of trench and killed five Englishmen, an
answering fusillade killed five Germans. (Cobb in Axelrod, 2006, p. 76)
The Prisoner’s Dilemma can be identified in several other aspects of life, from politics,
biological systems, economics and so on.
2.5.2 The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma the players only play one round. In the Iterated Pri-
soner’s Dilemma (IPD) the game is played repeatedly, with the number of rounds being
either a fixed number, an infinite number or a random number. This makes it possible
for players to keep a history of how their opponent plays, and introduce the opportunity
to punish the player’s opponent for not cooperating. Axelrod (2006, p. 12) argues that
it is primarily under these conditions that cooperation will emerge, because “the choices
made today not only determine the outcome of this move, but can also influence the later
choices of the players”. The fact that the players’ paths can cross again (i.e. new round
in IPD), both with a presumably clear memory of their opponent’s action in the previous
game, gives them an incentive to act cooperative towards their opponent.
The extension to an iterated game introduces the concept of strategies. In game theory
and, therefore, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a strategy is a recipe a player follows to gain a
goal, in this case the maximum score (or, to keep the thread to the metaphor of prison, the
minimum penalty). A strategy specifies what the player should do in every case, so that if
the opponent does A, the player should perform action B, or if the opponent does C, the
player should perform action D. There are several strategies for the IPD, ranging from
2Criminologists might disagree.
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the simple ALL-D strategy which always defects, to complex strategies using Bayesian
inference to select the best choice for the long run (Axelrod, 2006, p. 14).
In the one round PD, defection is always the best strategy (Axelrod, 2006, p. 10). The
same applies for IPD games where the game is played exactly N times. There is no
incentive to cooperate on the very last move of an N -round game because the players will
never meet again, and thus have no reason to fear that their actions will affect their score
in later rounds. This is also true for the next-to-last round, as both players can anticipate
defection from each other in the last round (i.e., the next round). If we apply this to every
round from N − 1 all the way back to the first round, we can observe that there isn’t any
reason for the players to cooperate at all in a IPD game with a fixed number of rounds.
(Luce and Raiffa in Axelrod, 2006, p. 10)
In an IPD game played with an unknown or infinitive number of rounds, however, assu-
ming that the players do not know how many iterations the game is composed of, defection
isn’t always the best move, and the players should rather cooperate than defect to avoid
being punished by their opponents later in the game. However, if a player is playing
against a player who always defect, the safest strategy is to defect.
Another variant of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is the Peace War Game. In this game,
the two decisions (i.e. defect, cooperate) are replaced with Peace and War. The game is
used in academic circles to study the possible strategies for cooperation and aggression,
but the metaphor is changed from being a prison-scenario to being a metaphor of countries’
actions in the world, i.e. making peace or war.
2.5.3 Axelrod’s Tournament
In 1980, Robert Axelrod held a tournament of various strategies for the Prisoner’s di-
lemma. Game theorists were encouraged to submit strategies to the tournament, and
the strategies would be tested in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Strategies were
submitted by game theorists from several different fields of science, and a total of 14 stra-
tegies were submitted. These 14 strategies were paired with each other plus a random
strategy (i.e. a strategy choosing either cooperate or defect randomly) in a round robin
tournament, with a game lenght of 200 moves (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). What Axel-
rod discovered in his tournament was that the greedy strategies tended to do poorly (i.e.,
the ones who defected), while the altruistic strategies performed noticeably better. The
tournament showed that the overall best strategy was the simplest strategy submitted,
the Tit-For-Tat strategy (TFT). TFT had the property of being nice, that is, it was never
the first to defect, something which proved to be a key property of all the high-scoring
strategies.
Some of the strategies submitted to Axelrod’s Tournament will be discussed in the next
section.
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2.5.4 Strategies for Prisoner’s Dilemma
2.5.4.1 2p IPD strategies
Always-Defect might be the simplest strategy for IPD. This strategy will always defect,
no matter what its opponent does.
Always-Cooperate is competing with ALL-D for simplest strategy. This strategy will,
as the name implies, always cooperate, no matter what its opponent does.
Tit-For-Tat is, as mentioned in section 2.5.3, the winning strategy from Axelrod’s
Tournament. It is composed of two parts:
1. Cooperate on the first move
2. On the next move, do whatever your opponent did on the previous move.
TFT, created by Professor Anatol Rapoport, is by far the most well known strategy for the
IPD today. Even though it is a very simple strategy, it has a key property which separates
it from the low-scoring strategies in the IPD: the property of never being the first to defect.
That is, a player using the TFT will only defect once someone else have defected against
the player first. Axelrod (2006) describes a strategy which never is the first to defect
as being nice. TFT is also a very robust strategy, meaning a strategy which can grow
or reproduce in an environment filled with other or similar strategies. It also has high
evolutionary stability against the ALL-D strategy, where evolutionary stability refers to a
dominant strategy’s ability to hold it’s position as a dominant strategy in an environment.
This means that if you have an environment where all the players are playing TFT, and a
mutant playing ALL-D shows up, the players using TFT will outperform ALL-D (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981).
Friedman is another “nice” strategy for IPD, but of all the nice strategies submitted
to Axelrod’s Tournament, Friedman scored the worst. Friedman is a very unforgiving
strategy. It starts out with a cooperative move, as it must to be considered nice, and
then continues to cooperate as long as its opponent cooperates. If the opponent defects,
however, Friedman will defect immediately, and continue to defect for the remainder of
the game (Axelrod, 2006).
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Downing is a rather complex strategy in the sense that it tries to mimic the actions of
human subjects in a Prisoner’s Dilemma laboratory experiments (Axelrod, 2006, p. 34).
It tries to “understand the other player and then to make the choice that will yield the
best long-term score based upon this understanding” (Axelrod, 2006, p. 34). It does this
by estimating a probability of the other playing cooperating after it either cooperates or
defects, and if the opponent seems unresponsive, it deliberately tries to maximise its own
winning by defecting against the opponent
Axelrod (2006) categorises it as a “fairly sophisticated decision rule”, but argues that its
poor performance in Axelrod’s Tournament was based on an implementation flaw that
assumed that the other player initially would be unresponsive. This led Downing to
defect on the first two moves, causing it to score poorly when the other players defected
in revenge.
Joss is another interesting strategy which tries to increase its score by performing a
random defection now and then. It is basically a modified TFT-strategy that randomly
defects about 10% of the time. It performed poorly in Axelrod’s Tournament, as any
defection against TFT would cause TFT to defect in response, thus leading Joss to defect
in response to TFT’s defection, and an endless cycle of mutual defection was started
(Axelrod, 2006).
2.5.4.2 3p IPD strategies
Just as there is a difference between a single-iteration Prisoner’s Dilemma and a Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a difference between IPDs with two, three or more players.
Therefore its necessary to examine these differences before we study strategies for the
different game types. In a 2-player IPD (2p IPD), there are always two and only two
players facing each other in a given dilemma. Although there can be several players
playing at the same time in the same environment, all battles are fought between two
players. In a 3-player IPD (3p IPD) there are always three players facing each other
in a given dilemma (Matsushima and Ikegami, 1998). If we defined Diplomacy as a 3p
IPD, all battles would be fought between three players at the time, but, given the rules of
Diplomacy, this is not always the case. In Diplomacy, all battles can be fought between
two and more players, where the maximum number of players are equal to the number
of units there is room for adjacent to a province. As Diplomacy can be played with 7
players, we could say that the IPD aspect of Diplomacy is a 7p IPD, but the more general
term N -player IPD is more fitting. In an N -player IPD, any number of players can play
against each other for a given dilemma.
The problem with strategies such as Tit-For-Tat is that while they perform good in a
two-player IPD setting, the performance drops if noise is introduced (i.e. noisy 2p IPD).
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The same is true if the noise in the 2p IPD is replaced with a third player, making it a
3p IPD (Matsushima and Ikegami, 1998). Matsushima and Ikegami (1998, p. 54) writes
the following about noise in the IPD:
The role of noise in the iterated prisoner|s dilemma game is to destabilise mu-
tual cooperating states by creating a high level of distrust between the players.
For example, two TFTs will alternatively defect each other. Because of the
resulting distrust, TFT will be replaced by strategies which are more tolerant
of defections, but at the same time more complex strategies will evolve.
What we can see from this is that noise in a IPD makes the players distrust each other,
and makes the possibility of the players making a wrong decision based on inaccurate
input more probable. Matsushima and Ikegami (1998) states that many-person games
are complex in the sense that the effectiveness of retaliations is not assured. Even if
the players can recognise and punish the defector, because of simultaneous playing, they
cannot be certain that they will not punish another player, or that their attack will punish
the defector at all.
Neither Diplomacy nor StateCraft in their simplest forms are noisy3, but both games
have the aspect of being N -player games. This is, assuming that we look at the IPD-
aspect of the games, somewhat equivalent to a noisy 2p IPD in the sense that the many
players make the complexity of the game far greater, and that an attack on a player might
affect several other players because several players can share the same dilemma provinces
(e.g. player P1 tries to defect against P2 by attacking a dilemma province, but ends up
attacking players P3 and P4 in addition to P2, because the attacked province is a dilemma
for all four players).
Matsushima and Ikegami (1998) ran simulations using an evolutionary approach to find
strategies which performed good in a 3p IPD. The strategies that proved to dominate the
population of strategies in the simulations were named Strategy-X and Strategy-Y.
Strategy-X will start out cooperating. It will continue to cooperate if both the oppo-
nents either defect or cooperate (i.e. CC or DD), but will change to a defective state if one
opponent defects and one opponent cooperates (i.e. CD, see arch marked CD from C to D
in Figure 2.4). Once in the defective state, it will continue to defect until both opponents
cooperate at the same time (i.e. CC), at which time it will return to the cooperative state.
3Although one could argue that the social aspect of the games could make them “noisy”, in the sense
that if a player attacks you, you cannot be sure that he is not performing the attack as a good-will favour
to some other player
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Diagram of Strategy X and Strategy Y
(Matsushima and Ikegami, 1998)
Figure 2.4: Strategy-X and Strategy-Y
Strategy-Y will start out cooperating, and will continue to do so as long as both its
opponents cooperates. If one or both of his opponents defects (i.e. CD or DD), he will
switch to a defective state, and will continue to defect no matter what his opponents does
for the rest of the game (i.e., he will become ALL-D). Strategy-Y is 3p IPD version of the
2p IPD Friedman strategy (see section 2.5.4.1)
2.5.5 Prisoner’s dilemma in StateCraft
In the case of StateCraft or, for that matter, Diplomacy, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can
be observed when two players want to occupy the same province at the same time. To
exemplify, say we have two players, P1 and P2, and a very valuable province, L1. Both
players occupy and have one or more units situated in provinces adjacent to L1, and both
of them wants to occupy province L1. In Figure 2.5, we can see P1 as Russia, occupying
among other provinces, Warsaw. P2 is played by Turkey, occupying Sevastopol, among
other provinces. Moscow is the valuable province L1. Depending on the choices the
players make, the situation have three different outcomes:
1. One of the players, P1, chooses to defect by moving to L1, while the other player,
P2, chooses to cooperate with P1 by not moving for L1. The outcome is that P1 gain
everything while his opponent, P2, gain nothing. This could, of course, have been
played out the other way, with P1 cooperating and P2 defecting, but the outcome
would have been the same. P1 = 5, P2 = 0.
2. Both of the players choose to defect by moving for L14. None of them will gain
control of the province, as only one player can occupy one province at a time, and
none of the units have support from other units, thus resulting in a standoff where
4This is the outcome demonstrated in Figure 2.5
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Figure 2.5: Prisoner’s Dilemma in Diplomacy
none of the players are more powerful than the other. Both of the players will have
to move back to the province from which they came, and both of the players will
“loose”, as they just threw away a perfectly good move by moving to a province at
the same time as another player. P1 = 1, P2 = 1.
3. None of the players chooses to move to L1, which translates to cooperating in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. They will both experience some gain, although not as great
a gain as they would have experienced if they actually occupied the province. The
reason that this is regarded as some gain for both of them is that their opponent
didn’t occupy the province, and because of this they are both free to occupy the
province later on. In addition they (ideally) didn’t waste their move by holding the
unit’s position but rather focused on occupying something else, or helping another
unit or player. This roughly translates to a situation where none of the prisoner’s
chooses to defect (or both cooperates), and is in game theory regarded as the safest
strategy. P1 = 3, P2 = 3.
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Chapter 3
Diplomacy & StateCraft
3.1 About this chapter
This chapter contains information about the Diplomacy board game, its rules and history.
It also includes information about StateCraft, the Java implementation of the board game
used as the foundation of our thesis.
In addition to information about the original StateCraft implementation, it also contains
information about the TacticTree, an addition to the tactical layer of StateCraft. The
TacticTree is created by Christoph Carlson and Mathias Hellevang, with the goal of im-
proving the performance of tactic generation by utilising a tree-based depth-first approach
to generate tactics for the Caeneus Agent. The reason for implementing the TacticTree
is based on a problem identified in the original StateCraft implementation. The problem
occurred when the agents reached a certain number of units, making the number of legal
tactics too big to be processed by an ordinary computer in an acceptable time frame.
3.2 Diplomacy
Diplomacy is a strategic social multiplayer board game that focuses on diplomacy as
a tactic for reaching the goal state of world domination. Created in 1954 by Allan B.
Calhamer, Diplomacy has been popular ever since.
The setting of Diplomacy is a Europe in war, more specific Europe during the First
World War. Seven nations (Russia, The United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, The
Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary), play for the sovereignty of Europe. The board
is a map of Europe divided into 75 provinces, and each nation starts out with a specific
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Figure 3.1: Map of Diplomacy
set of provinces (e.g., The United Kingdom has the British isles), which are considered
the nation’s home provinces. The provinces are land, open waters and coastal areas.
The players can build and commandeer units of two types: armies and fleets. Armies
are land-based units and are used to occupy territory inland. Fleets are sea-based units
used to occupy open waters and coastal areas. Both armies and fleets can occupy coastal
areas. Armies can be given orders to move or hold position. Fleets can be ordered to
move, hold position, or the fleet-specific order of convoying armies from one province to
another province crossing a sea area. Both armies and fleets can assist other units, either
the player’s own units or the units of an opponent.
Some of the provinces have supply centres. The supply centres have the property of
mapping 1:1 to a unit, so by occupying a new supply centre, the player is given the
opportunity to build a new unit. The player cannot have more units than supply centres,
so if he wants to build extra units he needs to occupy new supply centres. If the player
loses a supply centre to an enemy after he has built a new unit, he cannot support his
current units, and has to scale down his army by destroying one of his units. Only the
provinces with supply centres in the player’s starting area can build units. Provinces the
player occupies during the game cannot be used to build new units.
Given that the supply centres are a requirement for expansion of the players’ armies, they
are necessarily an important aspect of the game. Additionally, the winning state of the
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game can only be reached by controlling 18 supply centres.
A province can only hold one unit at a time. To occupy a new province, there are 5
different scenarios:
S1 Unit U1 moves into province P1 which is unoccupied, with no other attackers
trying to occupy it. U1 occupies the province.
S2 Unit U1 moves into Province P1 which is occupied by unit U2. This leads to
a standoff, and U1 has to retreat to the province from which he came. U2
keeps province P1.
S3 Unit U1 moves into Province P1, with support from unit U2. Province P1
is occupied by unit U3, but since U1 and U2 outnumber U3, U1 occupies
the province while U3 has to retreat to an empty, adjacent province, or is
disbanded.
S4 Unit U1 moves into Province P1, with support from unit U2. Province P1 is
occupied by unit U3, with support from unit U4. This leads to a standoff like
in S2, and U1 has to retreat to his province from which he came.
S5 Unit U1 moves into Province P1, which is unoccupied. Unit U2 also moves
into P1 from another province. This leads to a standoff where none of the
players outnumber each other, with the result that both U1 and U2 must
retreat to the provinces from which they came.
As the name implies, social interaction makes up an essential part of Diplomacy. To win
a player needs to control a majority (18) of the supply centres, a control that can be hard
or even impossible to reach unless the player chooses to form alliances during the course
of the game.
The game is divided into different rounds, where each round represents a season. Spring
and autumn are known as action rounds, and gives the player the ability to perform
actions affecting the position of the units (e.g. unit relocation, supporting other units
and convoying other units). Spring and autumn are preceded with a negotiation phase,
where the players negotiate and form alliances between each other. For example, before an
action round, England might ask France to support an attack on a german province, while
France might ask something of England in return, e.g. to “give” him a province France
considers strategically important. The orders given by the players in the action rounds are
interpreted in the summer or winter round, making the outcome of the preceding round
visible for the players. This means that if a player promises another player to support him
in some action, while in reality chooses to break his alliance and rather attack the one he
promised to support, this will not be visible for the players until the following season.
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Another aspect of Diplomacy is that the game’s combat system has no element of ran-
domness, and all randomness incorporated in the game is the randomness given by players
when choosing a move. This makes it very interesting in a context of AI, as any random-
ness will have to be implemented in the autonomous agents.
3.3 StateCraft and The Caeneus Architecture
In 2006, Arne S. Helgesen and Aleksander Krzywinski published their master thesis titled
“The Caeneus Architecture – An Agent Architecture for Social Board Games”. The the-
sis presented “a general architecture for any kind of social board game using Diplomacy
as a testbed” (Helgesen and Krzywinski, 2006). The Caeneus Architecture was used to
implement a game the authors named “StateCraft”, a social multiplayer game based on
the game Diplomacy. The result of the thesis consists of the Caeneus Architecture, a
game engine (StateCraft), an agent (the Caeneus Agent) that operates within the world
described in the game engine and a graphical game interface which makes it possible for
human players to interact with the agent.
3.3.1 The Caeneus Architecture
Helgesen and Krzywinski (2006) describe the The Caeneus Architecture as a “one pass,
three layered hybrid architecture”. Three layered here means the architecture is divided
into three modules, each having separate responsibilities. One pass refers to the fact
that the agents using the architecture receives the input (the game state) in one end and
sends it through the system from A to B, until a tactic is chosen. The architecture is
inspired by the Subsumption Architecture, first presented by Brooks (1990). The Caeneus
Architecture differs from the Subsumption architecture by being proactive in addition to
reactive, because, as Helgesen and Krzywinski (2006) claim, an agent in the domain
of Diplomacy would be useless without being proactive. Proactive behaviour means the
ability to act in advance of future situations, rather than just reacting to the current game
state, as a reactive architecture would. Wooldridge (2002) referred to an architecture with
both of these capabilities as a hybrid architecture.
Helgesen and Krzywinski (2006) describe the three layers as:
The Operational layer focuses on single pieces and their opportunities
The Tactical layer focuses on how all the pieces can combine their efforts
The Strategic layer focuses on diplomatic negotiation and long-term plan-
ning
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The layers operate concurrently, and have their own internal computation mechanism for
processing received input (Helgesen and Krzywinski, 2006).
3.3.1.1 The Operational layer
The Operational layer of StateCraft is purely reactive. It registers the current game state
and generates all the legal operations for every unit. By all legal operations we refer to
every move, support, hold or convoy operation a unit can perform without breaking the
rules of the game (Helgesen and Krzywinski, 2006).
3.3.1.2 The Tactical layer
The Tactical layer combines the operations created in the operational layer to generate
tactics. A tactic is a combination of operations for every unit for a country. The tactical
layer is also responsible for ranking the tactics by a value, describing how “good” a tactic
is. The tactics that are considered good are given a high value, while poor tactics are given
a low value. This value is based upon several heuristics. For instance a tactic containing
a move operation which has the potential of giving the agent control of a supply centre is
in most cases more valuable than a tactic containing only hold operations (Helgesen and
Krzywinski, 2006).
The Valuator class calculates a tactic’s potential value and a tactic’s factual value. The
potential value ignores the opponents units and valuates the tactics based on what it
potentially can achieve. The factual value takes probability of success into consideration,
something which is influenced by e.g. the opponent’s units. If a tactic has 100% certainty
of succeeding, the potential value will be equal to the factual value. Both the potential
and factual value are calculated by using several heuristics created for this purpose.
3.3.1.3 The Strategic layer
The Strategic layer is the most complex layer because it has to decide which tasks to do
and how to communicate with the other players. The implementation originally consisted
of 4 modules (see Figure 3.2):
• The ChooseTactic module, which selects the tactic the agent performs, based on
its factual values and a little dash of randomness.
• The SupportSuggestor module, which analyses the game state, looking for situa-
tions where an opponent could contribute with support. It is also responsible for
sending messages asking for support.
30
Inhibitors are not depicted in this picture, as they were not used for any of the modules
in the original version of StateCraft
Figure 3.2: Architecture of Strategic layer
(Helgesen and Krzywinski, 2006)
• The AnswerSupportRequest module receives support suggestions from the op-
ponents and decides whether the agent should answer yes or no, based on criteria
such as relationship to the message sender and randomness.
• The Relationship module keeps track of the relationships to the other countries
and adjusts this based on the opponents’ actions, such as supports and attacks.
Relations are represented as states in a Final State Machine, and can either be of
state Friend, Neutral or War.
• The Planner, which evaluates the agent’s position in the game and selects long-
and short-term goals.
“The strength of the Subsumption architecture lies in its ability to accept new modules
(behaviours) as more complex behaviours are needed” (Helgesen and Krzywinski, 2006, p.
52). This has proved to be advantegeous for us, as the main parts of our contributions to
the game have fitted seamlessly as modules into the Strategic layer.
Modules in the Strategic layer, like the Subsumption architecture, receive input through
sensors and express their output through actuators. Modules are able to override input to
other modules by acting as suppressors (see orange S-symbols in Figure 3.2), or override
output from modules by acting as inhibitors.
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3.4 TacticTree
The TacticTree is a data structure used to generate and represent all the tactics for a
given agent. A tactic1 is a combination of operations2 for all the units of an agent. An
example of a tactic can be:
[F hol -> bel(638) - A mun (supp) kie -> ber(851) - A kie -> ber(670)]
This syntax describes the operation for each unit the agent controls. F hol -> bel means
that the fleet in Holland moves to Belgium. A mun(supp) kie -> ber means that the
army in Munich supports the move from Kiel to Berlin. The numbers (638, 851 and 670)
represents the potential value of each operation in the tactic, i.e. the move operation
[F hol -> bel(638)], moving the fleet from Holland to Belgium, has a potential value of
638. The potential value, along with the more conservative factual value is created by
an object known as the Valuator, using several heuristics to calculate how “important” a
given operation is.
An agent can have several tactics, where the number of tactics is determined by the
number of legal permutations of operations. An example is a country with 10 units,
where each unit has 10 possible operations. This leads to a total of 10ˆ10 = 10 000 000
000 tactics. In the original version of StateCraft each tactic was represented as a list of
operations, making generation of tactics a repetitive task where each tactic was cloned
and changed marginally to accommodate the small change that separates one tactic from
another, i.e. the last operation. This made the generation of tactics a very time- and
memory-consuming task. Therefore, we introduced the TacticTree as a means of tackling
these issues. This allows us to represent the tactics as a tree structure rather than as a flat
list-based structure, which we argue3 reduces the number of clone operations performed
during creation of the tactics, as well as the memory footprint of the agent.
The TacticTree (see Figure 3.3) is a tree structure consisting of OperationNodes as its
nodes / vertices. An OperationNode is a structure containing a reference to an Operation-
object. Each OperationNode has a reference to a parent node, either another Operation-
Node or the root. The reference to the parent node makes it possible to traverse the tree
from leaf to root, using the path formed by the child-parent references to navigate from
a node, starting at the leaf, via its parent, its parent’s parent (and so on), until we have
1A tactic is represented by the class Tactic
2An operation is represented by the class Operation
3The increase in performance and reduction of memory consumption for the agent has not been
measured as the TacticTree was implemented as a means to combat problems with the original program,
rather than as a goal in itself. Although we do not have any quantitative data as a result of benchmark
testing, we have observed that the agent is capable of handling more units in an acceptable time frame
using the tree structure.
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Figure 3.3: TacticTree
Algorithm 3.1 Traversing TacticTree
OperationNode currentNode = this;
while(!currentNode.isRoot()) {
// perform some operation
currentNode = currentNode.getParent();
}
reached the root node (see Algorithm 3.1 for traversal algorithm). There is no reference
from parent to child, as this is deemed unnecessary for the tasks the tree performs. A
path in the tree is semantically the equivalent to a list-based tactic, where each element
in the list is the same as an OperationNode in the TacticTree.
3.4.1 Generating the TacticTree
The class Tactics is given the responsibility of generating the TacticTree. This was the
class used to generate the collection of Tactics for the Caeneus Agent in the original version
of StateCraft, but the class has been re-factored to accommodate the requirements of the
TacticTree. The tree is generated recursively, starting at the top, building in a depth-first
order, similar to pre-order tree traversal. The height of the tree is equal to the number of
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Figure 3.4: Generating the TacticTree
units the agent has, plus one for the root node. Each level in the tree consists of all the
operations a given unit has, and no order from another unit will ever exist on the same
level.
As visualised in Figure 3.4, a tactic is created by starting at the root node, adding the
first operation for the first unit processed as the child of the root node. The algorithm will
then continue by performing recursive calls, travelling deeper into the tree, thereby adding
an operation for the next unit as the child of the current node. When it reaches a leaf
node, the node is used to create an instance of the TreeTactic-class, thus representing a
complete tactic. The algorithm then backtracks to the parent node, and continues to add
children to the current node until it reaches another leaf node. This cycle will continue
until the tree is filled.
Algorithm 3.2 gives a pseudo-code representation of the algorithm used to generate the
TacticTree. This is a simplistic overview of the implementation, lacking features such as
tactic validation and pruning, but never the less gives a brief walk through of the main
parts of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 3.2 Generating the TacticTree
createTacticTree(currentNode, n)
if isLeafNode(currentNode)
addCompleteTactic(currentNode);
return;
for each operation for unit n
nextNode = new OperationNode(operation)
nextNode.setParent(currentNode);
createTacticTree(nextNode, n+1);
3.4.2 Pruning of the TacticTree
In order to keep the number of tactics to a manageable size, a number of pruning tech-
niques have been introduced. Pruning is the act of removing branches from the tree to
reduce its size. By removing potential tactics early, we avoid wasting system resources
otherwise used to create illegal, stupid or unnecessary tactics. Pruning in StateCraft is
performed by the following algorithms.
3.4.2.1 Mandatory operations
Mandatory operations is a structure used to keep record of any mandatory operation a unit
must perform. This structure is necessary to maintain consistency between collaborating
units, e.g. a unit supporting or convoying another unit, and the unit being supported or
convoyed. When an operation containing a support operation is identified, the unit that
performs the supported operation is put into a HashMap supporting key-value look-ups,
with unit as key and the operation as the value, reserving the unit for this particular
operation.
To give an example, assume that the first unit (i.e. the first level of the tree) contains a
support order, where the supported unit has yet to be processed by the algorithm. The
algorithm will then put the reserved unit and the operation the unit is reserved for into
the HashMap, thereby making it possible to perform a look-up for reserved operations
when the unit is processed. When the unit is reserved for an operation, it cannot perform
tasks differing from the one defined in the HashMap.
As seen in Figure 3.5, the grey operations are pruned because the operation swe -> nor
is the mandatory operation for the army in Sweden.
35
Figure 3.5: Mandatory operations
3.4.2.2 Rules
The original implementation of StateCraft was highly dependent upon rules to remove
stupid, illegal or unnecessary tactics. However, after implementing the TacticTree, the
original rules became useless, as the TacticTree works differently than the old structure.
Therefore, we have re-written all the rules used by the class Tactics to accommodate the
new data structure. These are named as following:
TreeCircleRule prunes the tactics where the units are moving in circles.
TreeCollisionRule removes the tactics where two or more units are trying to move into
the same province.
TreeConsistencyRule removes the tactics where unit A tries to convoy unit B, but unit
B does not perform the move order specified for the convoy.
TreeDoubleBookedConvoiRule prunes the tactics where several units are trying to
utilise the same fleet for convoy.
TreeIllegalSupportRule removes the tactics where unit A supports unit B, where unit
B does not perform the move order specified for the support order.
TreeUnecessaryConvoiRule prunes the tactics where unit A is convoyed by unit B,
although unit A can reach the target without crossing the water.
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The common denominator for these rules is that they remove tactics containing operations
which are illegal per the rules of the game. In addition to these, three more rules have
been added, where the focus have changed from removing illegal or impossible tactics to
removing tactics containing operations which, from a human point of view, most likely
would be deemed poor or stupid, but not necessarily illegal or impossible to accomplish.
TreeChainedConvoiRule seeks to prune the number of tactics by removing tactics
containing convoy-chains considered too complex to be feasible in a game scenario.
That is, if a tactic contains a move operation using several convoys to get from one
place to another, e.g. from Norway to North Africa, it will often be impossible to ac-
complish without any enemy interruptions, and is therefore considered unnecessary
and will be removed. This is a somewhat special rule as it might be characterised as
a heuristic, rather than a rule, because a chained convoy is not technically against
the rules of the game.
TreeUselessHoldRule seeks to prune the number of tactics by removing tactics contai-
ning stupid or useless hold operations. Specifically, it will prune tactics where a unit
tries to hold, even though there are no enemies adjacent to the unit. The reason for
this rule is that while holding may be feasible in several situations, the agent most
likely will have several other good alternative operations for this unit. This is, like
TreeChainedConvoiRule, also technically a heuristic.
TreeUselessSupportRule is a rule implemented to prune the number of tactics by re-
moving tactics containing useless support operations. An example is when a unit
tries to support another unit moving into a province where the province isn’t adja-
cent to any provinces containing enemy units. That is, the rule removes all tactics
containing a support operation and a move operation, where the unit moving is
located such that it will never need the support operation to perform the move (i.e.
the unit moving is located far away from any enemies).
The new rules are, as already mentioned, heuristics rather than rules, but are implemented
never the less because they are helpful in the task of pruning the rapidly (exponentially!)
growing TacticTree.
3.4.2.3 Roulette pruning
Roulette pruning is an algorithm used to calculate the value and survival odds of a tactic.
The methods works by simulating a roulette wheel from the classical casino game of
Roulette. Basically it uses a Java Random-object to generate a double D1 between 0.0
and 1.0, and checks this number against a number D2 created by algorithms calculating
the survival odds of a tactic based on variables such as the maximum potential value of
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the unit, a pruning factor calculated by the depth of the unit in the tree, as well as the
potential value of the particular operation being processed. If D1 > D2, the tactic will
“survive”, i.e. be stored for later use, and if D1 < D2, the tactic will be discarded.
Figure 3.6: Chance of survival
Figure 3.6 visualises the roulette wheel of the algorithm, where an operation has 27, 9%
chance of survival, based on the potential value of the operation versus the best potential
value of the unit. In other words, it is a 27, 9% chance that D1 > D2 for this particular
operation.
3.4.2.4 isRetreating()
isRetreating() is a method that checks whether a unit is moving away from an enemy
or not. There are very few good reasons for a player to retreat back into his empire in this
game. Unless the player wishes to occupy or protect a supply centre from an advancing
enemy, or he has made some sort of alliance with his opponents (forcing him to stay put),
he most likely would want to advance into unoccupied territory or enemy provinces.
Therefore, we have chosen to dispose of all tactics where a unit is moving away from the
enemy (i.e. retreating). An example of this is when a unit is located at a province two
moves away from the closest enemy, but tries to move to a province three moves away
from the closest enemy, without having any good reasons for doing so (i.e. moving closer
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to an unoccupied supply centre). The method works by performing a breadth-first search
for any move operations, where the start position is the province the unit is located at,
and the stop position is the closest province containing an enemy. It utilises a HashMap to
store the result of a search, with the goal of minimising redundant or duplicate searches.
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Chapter 4
Design and development
4.1 About this chapter
This chapter describes in detail the additions that have been implemented in StateCraft
as part of our master thesis. All the additions were made to the Caeneus Agent (the
StateCraft agent, see section 3.3), originally designed by Helgesen and Krzywinski (2006).
The three different modules are:
• The Emotion module
• The Prisoner’s Dilemma module
• The TacticTree
The Emotion Module is designed by Christoph Carlson to research the effects of emotional
agents in the domain of social board games such as StateCraft.
The Prisoners Dilemma Module is designed by Mathias Hellevang to measure the effecti-
veness of popular and “good” strategies for the classical game theory problem known as
the Prisoners Dilemma, in an n-player strategical board game such as StateCraft.
All modules were implemented using Java programming language version 1.6. Subversion
was used for versioning control, and Eclipse was chosen as IDE because of prior experience
with the application, as well as the availability of plug-ins such as Subclipse.
Most of the development has been based on agile methodologies, that is, development
phases were divided into short increments (usually day-to-day or week-to-week) with
minimal planning, with a focus on working code rather than extensive documentation.
Sketches and rough drafts were made on post-it notes, large changes were accommodated
as they surfaced, and pair-programming have been used whenever possible, where the
roles of driver and navigator were filled in a turn based manner.
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4.2 Emotion module
The Emotion module is a module created for the Strategic layer in Statecraft, with the
purpose of researching whether emotions will affect the agent’s performance or improve
the user’s game experience.
4.2.1 Choosing emotion model
To successfully synthesise emotions in the agent, we first needed to select an emotion
model to base the implementation on. The two alternatives considered were the OCC-
model (Ortony et al., 1988) and the three-layered architecture Sloman (1998). The OCC-
model was selected as the best choice because simplified versions of the OCC-model have
been implemented into several projects, some of them discussed earlier (see Section 2.4.6),
and the model has proven to be a good choice for synthesising emotions in agents. In
addition, the three-layered architecture lacks implementation-specific details, and it was
hard to find research were the model actually was applied.
4.2.2 Identifying emotions in Diplomacy
In order to help decide which emotions would be most relevant to implement for this
project, two criteria were set:
1. The emotion must be experienced during a game of Diplomacy
2. The emotion must influence the decision-making to some extent
In order to collect data about which emotions were experienced and how they influenced
decision-making, we conducted a player study. 7 players were invited to play the board
game. Afterwards, 4 of them were interviewed individually in a semi-structured interview
(Grønmo, 2007). They were asked to describe their emotions during the course of the
game, and how the emotions affected their choices.
Based on the responses, the most frequently occurring emotions were joy, loyalty, guilt,
fear, anger, shame, relief and disappointment. Relief and disappointment seems to lead
to the same outcome as joy and anger, and is therefore not included in Table 4.2. Shame
was also excluded since it overlaps with guilt.
We, thus, concluded that the most relevant emotions were joy, loyalty, guilt, fear and
anger. Joy, fear and anger are already included in the OCC-model.
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Emotion In which situations did the
emotion occur?
How did the emotion
influence your decisions?
Joy People tend to feel joy and
happiness when things go
their way (e.g. gaining a
province or beating
someone you consider a
peer). “When things went
my way, I felt happiness”,
said P1.
The participants seemed to
feel like they were on a roll,
and maybe not think
through their actions
thoroughly enough.
Loyalty P2 stated that he felt more
loyalty towards P1, because
P1 was the most
experienced player, and
therefore most likely the
best player. P3 stated that
he felt loyalty towards P5,
since P5 helped him defeat
P4 in Munich.
All of the participants
answered that loyalty made
them keep their promises
towards the player they
were loyal to, except from
P1 who thought it was a
stupid thing to do from a
cynical perspective.
Guilt The participants seem to
agree that guilt occurred
when one lies to another
player about supporting
him but attacks him
instead. P1 also added that
a player might feel guilt
when he “exterminates”
another player very early in
the game.
“The guilt might have
made me be more nice to
Sondre”, P3 claimed, while
P1 said that guilt had
caused him to keep players
with few units artificially
alive. P2 and P4 did not
think that the guilt affected
them in any significant way.
Fear Three of the participants
answered that they had
experienced some sort of
fear while playing
Diplomacy, and it seemed
to occur when they knew
that an opponent could
hurt them if he wanted to.
According to the
participants, fears leads to
a more defencive and
cautious approach, thus
taking fewer risks.
Anger Two of our participants
experienced anger while
playing Diplomacy. The
emotion was caused by a
negative event (e.g. losing
a province) when they had
an opponent to blame for
the province loss.
P1 claimed that the anger
drove him on a seek for
revenge. P4 had the same
opinion and said that he
threw all his resources into
getting his province back.
P1 through P7 represents the different participants.
Table 4.2: Summary of interview
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Figure 4.1: Structure used to synthesise emotions in StateCraft (based on the OCC model)
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Joy is considered as the reaction to an event which was construed as desirable by the
person.
Fear is the prospect of a situation which would be undesirable for that person.
Anger is the combination of distress because of an undesirable event and the feeling of
reproach towards a person who did something one does not approve of.
Loyalty is not defined in the OCC-model, and it is questionable that Ortony et al. (1988)
would even categorise it as an emotion, as it is not a valenced reaction to events, agents
or objects. However, the situations where the participants reported that they experienced
loyalty seem to be when they approved of another player’s actions. In the OCC-model,
admiration occurs when one approves another agent’s actions. Ortony et al. (1988) spe-
cified that the meaning of the words used to describe emotions in the OCC-model were
not necessarily equivalent to the meaning of the words in spoken English. Therefore, we
might say that what the participants actually meant was the emotion that is structured
as admiration in the OCC-model, since an effect of admiration often will be loyalty to the
admirer.
Admiration is the reaction to another agent’s action which one approves of.
Guilt is not categorised by the OCC-model either, but for the sake of simplicity, we claim
that guilt is a sub-category of the emotion shame. Guilt involves disapproving of one’s
own action towards another person, while also feeling sorry for that other person. This
could possibly have been structured as a compound emotion in the OCC-model, but even
though it is not included in the model, we choose to model guilt in our implementation
because we feel that it plays an important part in the domain of social board games.
Guilt is the disapproving reaction to one’s own action combined with feeling sorry for
the agent(s) which the action affected in an undesirable way.
4.2.3 Emotion intensity
The intensity of an emotion is represented by a numeric value between 0 and 100, where
all emotions start at a default value of 0. The alternative to a numeric value was to
implement the emotion as a binary value, meaning that it’s either switched on or off.
Since emotions differ in intensity (e.g. from mild irritation to furious rage) we considered
the numeric value to be the best choice for this implementation. For an emotion to affect
the agent’s decisions it needs to exceed the threshold set for the particular emotion.
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Algorithm 4.1 Anger calculation
IF joyV alue < 0 AND admirationV alue < 0
IF |joyV alue| > joyThreshold AND |admirationV alue| >
admirationThreshold
anger =
√
joyV alue ∗ admirationV alue
All emotions have a different intensity directed towards each player, except from joy, which
only has a general intensity. The emotions joy and admiration also have the possibility of
negative values down to −100. A joy value of −100 represents the opposite of joy, which
in the OCC-model is distress. A negative admiration value represents reproach. Alone,
distress or reproach does not affect the decisions made by the agent, but together they
form the emotion anger. The anger’s intensity is calculated by calculating the square root
of the absolute value of distress multiplied with reproach, provided that both of these
emotions exceed the negative threshold. Pseudo code can be seen in Algorithm 4.1.
To ensure that the agent has a clearly defined emotional state, the agent can only have
one emotion towards each country at the same time. The strongest emotion will suppress
the other emotions. Take for instance when Germany feels very angry and a little afraid of
Austria: since anger is the greatest in intensity, it will suppress the fear. The exception is
joy, since joy is general and not directed towards a particular country. However, if fear or
guilt is the strongest emotion towards a country, the intensity of joy will decrease. Also,
it is impossible to experience joy and anger at the same time, since anger depends on a
negative joy value.
4.2.4 Deciding emotion intensity
4.2.4.1 Joy
Joy is the positive reaction to events as specified by the OCC-model, and is therefore
naturally affected by the events. The event that increases the joy are:
• The agent gains a province. The intensity depends on the desirability of gaining the
province. Gaining a province containing a supply centre will be more desirable for
the agent, and therefore increase the joy more than gaining a province without a
supply centre.
In the emotion module, distress is modelled as the joy emotion with a negative intensity,
because joy and distress are mutually exclusive. The events that decrease joy are:
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Figure 4.2: Overview of emotion generation
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• The agent loses a province. Like when gaining a province, the desirability of keeping
the province influences the intensity.
• The agent asks for support. The opponent agrees to perform the support, but for
some reason avoids or neglects to perform the support.
• An opponent asks the agent for support and the agent performs the support order,
but the opponent does not perform the move order of which they asked support.
• The agent’s strongest feeling towards another player is guilt or fear.
• The agent is outnumbered by its opponents.
4.2.4.2 Admiration
Admiration is the approving reaction to actions by other agents, while reproach is the
disapproving reaction. Actions made by other agents which the agent approve of:
• An opponent agrees to support the agent and keeps the deal by supporting the
agent’s attack.
• An opponent with adjacent units does not attack the agent.
Reproach is represented as admiration with a negative value in the emotion module. The
actions which decrease admiration are:
• The agent asks an opponent for support and the opponent accepts. Despite this,
the opponent does not perform the support move.
• The agent is attacked by an opponent. The intensity of the emotion depends on
what the agent expects of the opponent. If the opponent and the agent has a
friendly relationship, the admiration towards the opponent will decrease more than,
for example, if they were at war.
4.2.4.3 Anger
Anger is the combination of reproach and distress, meaning that when admiration and joy
decreases, anger increases. The situations that decrease admiration and joy cause anger
to increase (see 4.2.4.1 and 4.2.4.2).
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4.2.4.4 Fear
Fear is the negative expectation to an upcoming event. The negative events which the
agents are likely to fear in StateCraft are to be attacked by an agent, and to be lied to
by someone who agreed to support the agent. For the sake of simplicity, we have chosen
to focus on the fear of being attacked by a mighty neighbour. The intensity is calculated
based on two factors:
Probability The more adjacent provinces the opponent has to the agent’s provinces, the
more likely it is that the opponent will attack.
Damage A more powerful opponent can do more damage to the agent than a less po-
werful opponent.
4.2.4.5 Guilt
Guilt is the disapproving reaction to one’s own action combined with feeling sorry for the
agent(s) which the action affected in an undesirable way. The events which increase guilt
are:
• The agent attacks an opponent it has a friendly or neutral relationship to.
• The agent agrees to support another player, but avoids performing the support
operation. The intensity is also dependent on the relationship to the other player.
If the agent performs a support towards a player which it feels guilty towards, the guilt
intensity will be reset to zero.
4.2.5 Affecting the agent’s decisions
4.2.5.1 Joy
Joy will make the agent perform more risky moves, since it will give it the feeling of “being
on a roll”.
4.2.5.2 Admiration
Admiration towards opponents will decrease the chance of the agent attacking them. In
addition, the agent will more likely perform the support moves it has promised towards
the opponents it admire.
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4.2.5.3 Anger
Anger towards opponents will increase the chance of the agent attacking the opponents.
It will also decrease the chance of the agent supporting them.
4.2.5.4 Fear
Fear towards opponents will decrease the chance of the agent attacking them. It will make
the agent more defencive.
4.2.5.5 Guilt
Guilt towards opponents will decrease the chance of the agent attacking them, and make
the agent less reluctant to support them.
4.2.6 Implementation details
Given that the Emotion module is an addition to the current agent in StateCraft, the
whole module has been implemented in the emotions package in the Strategic layer of
the agent in StateCraft. Since the Strategic layer uses an architecture similar to the Sub-
sumption system, using sensors to look for changes in the environment and actuators to
act on the changes from the sensors, the Emotion module receives input through an input
line from GameStateSensor, the sensor listening for new game states from the server, and
MessageSensor, the sensor listening for new SupportRequestMessages and AnswerSuppor-
tRequestMessages. Then it performs its actions by suppressing the input to ChooseTactic,
the module responsible for choosing tactics. Additionally, it inhibits the output from the
AnswerSupport module. Figure 4.3 depicts the Emotion module as part of StateCraft’s
Strategic layer.
4.2.6.1 EmotionSynthesizer
is the main class in the emotions package, used to tie all the different pieces together. It is
implemented as a module in the Strategic layer of StateCraft, which means that it has a
receive()-method, making it possible to couple the class with the output lines of different
sensors in the StateCraft subsumption-like environment, in this case the GameStateSensor
and MessageSensor. It also implements the Suppressor interface (see Figure 4.4), which
gives it the suppress()-method used to suppress the input to other modules, as well as the
Inhibitor-interface, which gives it the ability to inhibit the output of other modules.
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Figure 4.3: Emotion module in the Strategic layer
receive() is the method that receives the GameState and the diplomatic messages,
through EmotionSynthesizer’s input line that is added to the gameStateSensor in the
Strategic class. This ensures that the EmotionSynthesizer receive the GameState object
each action round, and thereby passes it to all of the emotions in the emotion list. Each
emotion considers the last rounds orders and outcomes and affects the emotion intensity
based on it. Each SupportRequestMessage and AnswerSupportRequestMessage is also
passed through the receive()-method of EmotionSynthesizer, and it keeps track of the
deals made in the preceding round.
suppress() is the method which suppresses the TacticList from the ChooseTactic mo-
dule and allows the module to remove tactics or change their values. This method calls
all the affectChoices()-methods in all the subclasses of Emotion.
inhibit() is the method which inhibits the outgoing AnswerSupportRequestMessage.
The message is stored until next round, when the agent will check to see if it performed
the support operations it promised.
4.2.6.2 Emotion
is an interface. All classes implementation Emotion is required to implement the methods
affectChoices(), affectEmotion() and getValueFor().
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affectEmotion() is the method used to affect the emotion intensity based on rules
described in each emotion. Each subclass of Emotion implements this corresponding with
the rules defined in Section 4.2.4.
affectChoices(TacticList) changes the TacticList based on the emotions’ intensities,
before it eventually returns it. This is where the emotions influence the agent’s decisions
according to the rules specified in Section 4.2.5.
getValueFor(Country) gets the emotion’s intensity towards the specified country
4.2.6.3 Joy
Joy is a class that implements the Emotion interface. As opposed to all the other emotions,
the joy emotion is not directed towards the other agents. It is general, and therefore the
intensity is stored in a integer variable and the increase- and decrease-methods ensures
that the value can not exceed 100 or go below -100. The intensity of the emotion is
changed in affectEmotions() based on the events from the last round. The orders for the
next round is changed in affectChoices().
affectEmotion() increases the joy intensity with a medium-sized random value for each
supply centre the agent gained in the previous round, and decreases it with a medium-
sized random value for each supply centre it loses. If the province contains a supply centre
it increase or decrease the value additionally with a large random value.
It also looks through the strongest emotions towards each opponent each round, and for
each opponent the agent feels guilty or fear towards, the joy intensity will decrease with
a small random value.
In addition, it has a private method that counts how many supply centres the average
country own. For each supply centre that the agent has less than average − 1, joy will
decrease by a small random value.
affectChoices() suppresses the TacticList and increases the factual value closer to the
potential value based on the intensity of joy. If the intensity is 100, the factual value will
become similar to the potential value. This makes the agent do more risky moves.
getValueFor(Country) gets the general intensity for joy even if a country is specified,
since joy is general.
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4.2.6.4 Admiration
Admiration is a class which implements the Emotion interface. The agent has an admi-
ration value for each of the country, and therefore the admiration values are stored in a
HashMap, where they key is the country and the value is an integer between -100 and
100.
affectEmotion() increases admiration towards the adjacent countries who did not at-
tack the agent last round. The admiration value increases by a small random value for
each adjacent province the country has. If the opponent attacks the agent, the agent’s
admiration will decrease based on how good the relationship to the attacking opponent
is.
The method also decrease the admiration value with a medium-sized random value towards
opponents that took a province without a supply centre from the agent and a large random
value to those that took a province with a supply centre.
affectChoices() increases the value of tactics where the agent attacks
4.2.6.5 Anger
Anger is a class which implements the Emotion interface. The class also contain a reference
to Joy and Admiration, since the intensity of anger is calculated based on these two values.
affectChoices() increases the factual value of tactics containing attack orders with
supports towards opponents the agent is angry at. It also removes the supports towards
countries that the agent is angry at. If the anger intensity is 80, the tactic will be removed
80% of the times.
affectEmotionBasedOnDiplomacy() increases anger towards an opponent with a
large random value when the opponents accepts a support request but does not perform
the support.
affectEmotionBasedOnPromisedSupportOrders() checks if an opponent which we
gave support to performed the move which was promised. If he did not, the anger increases
with a large random value.
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4.2.6.6 Fear
Fear is a class which implements the Emotion interface. The agent has a fear value
between 0 and 100 towards each country, which is calculated from scratch each round.
affectEmotion() This method updates the intensity of fear against each country each
round based on how close they are and how many supply centres they have.
affectChoices() This method decreases the factual value for each operation that in-
volves moving into or supporting attacks on countries that the agent is afraid of.
4.2.6.7 Guilt
Guilt is a class which implements the Emotion interface. It contains a guilt value between
0 and 100 towards each of the other countries.
affectEmotion() increases guilt intensity towards the countries the agent attacked the
previous round if they had a good relationship, but resets guilt to 0 towards an opponent
if the agent supported him last round. It also has a method for increasing guilt if the
agent has accepted a support order, but kept from performing it.
affectChoices() increases the factual value of a tactic with x%, where x is the intensity
of guilt, if the tactic contains support order where the supportee is someone the agent
admires. It also decreases the chance of attacking opponents the agent feels guilty towards.
4.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma module
The Prisoner’s Dilemma module is a module created for the Strategic layer in StateCraft
(see Section 3.3.1.3 for information about the Strategic layer) with the intention of re-
searching whether strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma will affect the performance of an
agent, and the game experience for a user.
4.3.1 Dilemmas in StateCraft
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is, as described earlier, a non-zero-sum game used to describe
the problem of cooperation vs. defection among rational actors in an environment where
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Figure 4.4: A simplified UML Class diagram for the Emotion module
the actors will not necessarily gain directly from cooperating with each other. StateCraft
contains several of these situations, but to better confine the problem at hand, dilemmas
have been defined as an empty province P1 adjacent to a province P2 containing a supply
centre, where two or more agents have units located adjacent to P1. The requirements
can also be summarised in list form. A dilemma is:'
&
$
%
Prisoner’s Dilemma requirements
1. An empty province P1
2. Where P1 is adjacent to a province P2
3. Where P2 contains a supply centre
4. Where two and more agents have units located adjacent to P1
In Figure 4.5 we see several provinces that fits our definition of a dilemma.
• Silesia is an empty province without a supply centre, located adjacent to the supply
centres in Berlin, Warsaw and Munich. Germany (dark grey player) has a unit
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Figure 4.5: Dilemmas in StateCraft
located in Berlin, while Austria-Hungary (red player) has a unit located in Munich.
• Burgundy is an empty province without a supply centre, located adjacent to the
supply centre in Marseilles, Paris, Belgium and Munich. Austria-Hungary has a unit
located in Munich, while France (light blue player) have units located in Marseilles
and Gascony.
In addition to these, there are several other provinces which satisfy the basic requirement
of being an empty province adjacent to a supply centre (1 through 3 in the definitions
for dilemmas), but still should not be treated as a dilemma. For instance, Ruhr is an
empty province without a supply centre (satisfies requirement 1), located adjacent to
the supply centres in Belgium, Holland, Munich and Kiel (satisfies requirement 2 and
3). Austria-Hungary has a unit located in Munich, and England (blue player) have units
located in Belgium, Holland and Kiel (satisfies requirement 4). All of England’s units
are of type fleet, so they are actually unable to move to Ruhr, thus posing no treat to
Austria-Hungary’s unit in Munich. This means that the province should not be trea-
ted as a prisoner’s dilemma, but the current version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma module
unfortunately does not identify these cases.
4.3.2 Implementation overview
Given that the the Prisoner’s Dilemma module is an addition to the current agent in
StateCraft, the whole module have been implemented in a single package (containing
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Figure 4.6: Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Strategic layer
sub-packages) in the Strategic layer of the agent in StateCraft. Since the Strategic layer
uses an architecture similar to the Subsumption system, using sensors to look for changes
in the environment and actuators to act on the changes from the sensors, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma module receives input via an input line from GameStateSensor, the sensor lis-
tening for new game states from the server, and performs its actions by suppressing the
input to ChooseTactic, the module responsible for choosing tactics. Figure 4.6 depicts
the Prisoner’s Dilemma module as part of StateCraft’s Strategic layer.
4.3.3 Implementation details : Prisoner’s Dilemma module
The main Prisoner’s Dilemma package contains all classes relevant for the identification
of provinces representing potential Prisoner’s Dilemma-situations (dilemmas), registering
and logging the agent’s actions (defection or cooperation), as well as two strategies for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, namely the Tit-For-Tat and Friedman strategies. The implementa-
tion details of these strategies will be presented in section 4.3.4. A UML Class diagram
for the Prisoner’s Dilemma module is shown in Figure 4.7.
4.3.3.1 PrisonersDilemma
PrisonersDilemma is the main class of the module. It is implemented as a module in
the Strategic layer of StateCraft, which means that it has a receive-method, making it
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Figure 4.7: UML Class diagram for Prisoner’s Dilemma module
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possible to couple the class with the output lines of different sensors in the environment,
in this case the GameStateSensor.
In addition to being a module, it is also a suppressor, meaning that it can be attached to
other modules in the system. Prisoner’s Dilemma acts as a suppressor to the ChooseTactic
module, which is responsible for choosing which tactic the agent should use. This means
that whenever some module is trying to send a TacticList to the ChooseTactic module,
Prisoner’s Dilemma will catch the input and perform whatever action it deems necessary
(e.g. removing tactics or boosting the value of tactics).
4.3.3.2 Defection
Defection is a model used to represent a defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma module.
Instances of this class will contain data about which country performed the defection,
which operation the defection appears in, which province it represents a defection for, as
well as a list containing information about which agents consider this province a dilemma
(and, by this, which agents this object represents a defection against).
4.3.3.3 DefectionChecker
DefectionChecker is responsible for registering defections by analysing the outcome of
action rounds, and checking the outcome of dilemmas by analysing the actions of the
agent the dilemma was relevant for. It creates a DefectionList containing objects of type
Defection, representing defections done by the different agents.
The class is accessed by all the agents, but contains conditions limiting the number of calls
to the methods in the class to once per season for a given year. The data created by the
DefectionChecker is valid for all agents, so when one agent has used the DefectionChecker
in a given round, all other agents accessing the DefectionChecker will simply be given the
data from the first call.
checkDefections() is the method responsible for registering defections performed in
the previous action round. It is called every summer and winter, and uses the current
GameState as well as the dilemmas defined for the previous spring or autumn to check,
based on the orders from the orderlist, which of the agents that defected. Based on its
findings, it creates objects of type Defection, and put them into the static DefectionList.
checkOutcome() is the method responsible for registering the outcome of dilemmas.
It is called every spring and autumn. The method is mostly used for logging of the data
each round provides us with, and not of real importance for the agents, as they keep their
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own internal register of who has defected against them. The method accesses an instance
of the DefectionList created by checkDefection in the previous round, and loops through
all the Defections in the list, using the current GameState and the Dilemmas for the
previous action round to see which agents that cooperated, which agents that defected,
and what the outcome of this situation is. It then writes the outcome of the situation as
well as a score to a log (see Section 2.5.1 for detailed information about score).
4.3.3.4 DefectionList
DefectionList is a data structure used to represent a collection of defections for a given
round. The class is implemented using a variant of the Singleton design pattern, restricting
the instantiation of the class to one object. This makes it possible for all the agents to
use the same list of defections when analysing what their opponents did in the previous
round. This list is created and re-created by the DefecionChecker each summer and winter
round.
4.3.3.5 DefectionRegister
DefectionList is a class used by the agents to keep a record of their opponents actions,
that is, it serves as the agent’s memory of previous defections performed by enemies.
Each agent using the Prisoner’s Dilemma module will have an instance of this object, and
this register will be changed based on the content of the DefectionList which the agents
analyse using the strategy they are configured to use (i.e. Tit-For-Tat or Friedman). The
necessity for such a register stem from the fact that in Diplomacy, unlike the theoretical
IPD-game, each round does not necessarily contain a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and as such,
if an agent is defected against in round 1, he might not be able to perform whatever
action he wants to perform in round 2 (e.g. Tit-For-Tat will defect against his opponent
in round 2 if defected against in round 1). Therefore, to make the agent able to perform
actions the next time a dilemma occurs instead of only in the next round, this register is
implemented.
The register is represented as a HashMap containing a country as a key and an integer as
a value. It has several methods for increasing and decreasing a value mapped to a country,
so when e.g. England defects against France, France will increase the value mapped to
England by one. When France again meets England in a dilemma, France can consult the
DefectionRegister for France and, based on the value contained and depending on which
strategy France uses, perform some action.
The value mapped to a country can also be decreased by one. For example will an agent
using the Tit-For-Tat strategy decrease the value for an opponent by one if the agent has
defected against the opponent, i.e. if the agent has performed an act of revenge using
defection.
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4.3.3.6 DilemmaFinder
DilemmaFinder is a helper class used to generate the Dilemmas-object used by the agents.
It loops through all provinces relevant for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, identifies which pro-
vinces are dilemmas in the current round and puts them in a Dilemmas-object. Like the
DefectionList this is also accessible to all the agents, but instead of using a Singleton
pattern it is based on a static method (findPrisonersDilemmas()), returning either a new
or a stored instance of Dilemmas to the agent calling the method.
4.3.3.7 Dilemmas
Dilemmas is a data structure used to represent all potential dilemmas for a given round.
In addition to containing all provinces and all countries affected by every dilemma, it
contains several methods to extract information regarding the dilemma (e.g. if a given
Province is a dilemma province, which countries a given province represents a dilemma
for etc.).
4.3.3.8 ScoreKeeper
ScoreKeeper is a class used to store the score the different players are awarded after the
outcome of a dilemma is summarised. Each player involved in the dilemma is given a
score depending on whether they defected or cooperated, and if they defected, whether
anybody else defected at the same time. See Table 2.1 for values. The score differs from
the ones in the table on one issue: if two players P1 and P2 defects, but P1 also receives
support for his move either from his own units or from the units of an opponent, P1 will
win the province, and is awarded 5 points, while P2 who also defected receives 0 points,
as he was not able to win the province according to the rules of StateCraft. This class is
of no importance to the agents, and is only used for logging purposes.
4.3.4 Implementation details : strategies
Two strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma have been implemented, Tit-For-Tat and Fried-
man. Tit-For-Tat has proven to perform well in a 2p IPD, while Friedman has been found
to perform good in a 3p IPD. StateCraft is an N -player IPD1, and because of these
differences, these strategies was selected as interesting candidates for StateCraft. Both
strategies are stored in sub-packages of the package strategy, located as a sub-package
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma module.
1The number of players in a IPD in StateCraft varies from game to game.
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The strategies have one key method in common, affectTacticList(), which performs some
action on the list of tactics it receives, based on the state of the DefectionRegister.
4.3.4.1 Friedman
Friedman is implemented in the class with the same name, located in the strategy package.
It receives a TacticList, an instance of Dilemmas, and the DefectionRegister. In short,
it iterates through all the operations in all the Tactics present in the TacticList, and
if an operation is either a support or move with the target of the operation being a
dilemma province, Friedman will check if it’s been defected against or not. If somebody
has defected against the agent in the previous action round, the Friedman strategy will
proceed to boost2 all tactics containing operations which targets dilemma provinces. On
the other hand, if nobody has defected against the agent, Friedman will remove all tactics
containing moves to potential dilemma provinces.
The strategy is implemented in accordance with the original specification of Friedman,
stating that it should never be the first to defect, but once Friedman is defected against,
it will continue to defect against everyone until the end of the game.
4.3.4.2 Tit-For-Tat
Tit-For-Tat is implemented in the class with the same name, located in the strategy-
package. It receives a TacticList, an instance of Dilemmas, and the DefectionRegister.
Like Friedman, it iterates through all the operations in all the Tactics present in the
TacticList, and if an operation is either a support or move with the target of the operation
being a dilemma province, Tit-For-Tat will check if it’s been defected against or not. If
an opponent have defected against the agent in a previous action round, the Tit-For-
Tat strategy will proceed to boost all tactics containing operations which target dilemma
provinces the defector and the agent have in common. However, it will not target dilemma
provinces which are shared with both the defector and a third part, unless said third party
also have defected against the agent. On the other hand, if nobody have defected against
the agent, Tit-For-Tat will remove all tactics containing moves to potential dilemma
provinces.
The Tit-For-Tat implementation used in the Prisoner’s Dilemma module is modified to
better accommodate the requirements given in the StateCraft environment. In contrast to
the original Tit-For-Tat implementation by Anatol Rapport (Axelrod, 2006), which stated
that Tit-For-Tat should cooperate on the first move, but retaliate in the next round when
2To boost a Tactic in StateCraft refers to the act of increasing the probability that the selected Tactic
will be chosen by the TacticChooser by increasing the Tactic’s factual value (which is used to describe
how “good” a Tactic is).
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defected against, the implementation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma module keeps a record of
defections over several rounds using the DefectionRegister.
The reason for this is the way a Prisoner’s Dilemma province is defined in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma module. There are only a finite number of relevant provinces in each round,
depending on the placement of the players’ units and provinces, thus, when a player P1
is defected against, it is not certain that he will be able to retaliate against the defector
in the next round. Also, a Prisoner’s Dilemma province for player P1 might not be a
Prisoner’s Dilemma province for player P2 in the next round. This means that player P2
might defect against P1 several times, increasing P1’s defection-count against P2. When
P1 has the possibility to do so, he will retaliate against P2 by invading P2’s Prisoner’s
Dilemma provinces, and P1 might do so several times spanning several rounds, given that
his defection count against P2 is sufficiently high (the count will increase or decrease by
1 for every defection or retaliation).
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Chapter 5
Evaluation of Emotion module
5.1 About this chapter
In this chapter we will evaluate the Emotion module. In the introduction of this thesis
we described a research question for the Emotion module:
RQ How does emotions affect the performance of the agent and player experience in
StateCraft?
This was concentrated into three more specific research questions:
RQ1 How do emotions affect the performance of the agent in terms of supply centres?
RQ2a Can players make a distinction between agents in StateCraft with and without
the Emotion module initialised and do they manage to identify what the agent is
feeling?
RQ2b Do players think it is more fun to play StateCraft against agents with emotions
than against agents without emotions?
RQ1 is explored and tested in Section 5.1.1. Statistical analysis of data collected by
running simulations of StateCraft using various configurations of the Emotion module is
used to evaluate the questions. All the data have been tested for normality, by using a
Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965). For the normally distributed data, we used
paired sample t-test (Wohlin et al., 2000). For the data that are not normally distributed,
we used Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wohlin et al., 2000). In all the t-tests, we use 95%
confident interval.
RQ2a and RQ2b is explored and tested in Section 5.1.3, where user testing is used as the
basis of the evaluation.
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Table 5.1: Emotion simulation configurations
Configuration Turkey Austria Italy Germany Russia France England Amount
All emo Emo Emo Emo Emo Emo Emo Emo 50
No emo 50
E101 Emo 30
E102 Emo 30
E103 Emo 30
E104 Emo 30
E105 Emo 30
E106 Emo 30
E107 Emo 30
5.1.1 Simulations
To study how emotions affect the agents in terms of performance, we decided to run
simulations of the game from 1901 to 1911, where all 7 players were controlled by agents.
As depicted in Table 5.1, a total of 9 simulation configurations were tested. The cells
marked Emo means that the specified country ran with the Emotion module initialised,
later referred to as an emotional agent. An empty cell means that the agent was launched
without the Emotion module, later referred to as a regular agent.
The All emo and No emo listings in Table 5.1 are configurations where all the agents are
either running with or without the Emotion module. E101 through E107 are configura-
tions where only one of the agents are running the Emotion module. Amount describes
how many simulations were run for a given configuration (e.g. All emo was run 50 times).
The data used for analysis was mainly the number of supply centres at the end of the
game (Spring 1911).
Table 5.2 and 5.3 contain the columns Country, Mean, Std dev, Median, Victories and
Extinctions. Country contains the name of the country. Mean contains the average
number of supply centres based on the 50 simulations, while Std dev is the standard
deviation. Median is the value separating the higher half of the sample from the lower
half of the sample, but since 50 is an even number, the median can be a decimal number
if the two middle values are not equal. Victories contains the number of games where
the specified country ended with the most supply centres. Occasionally, more than one
country “win”, for example if both Germany and France have 9 supply centres and all
the other countries have 8 or less. Extinctions contains the number of times where the
specified country ended the game with 0 supply centres.
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Table 5.2: Results from No emo simulations
Country Mean Std dev Median Victories Extinctions
Germany 7.10 2.978 7 27 0
Turkey 6.44 2.215 6 13 1
England 4.80 1.784 4 4 0
Austria 4.42 2.45 4 7 3
France 4.38 2.39 4.5 5 5
Italy 4.16 1.267 4 0 0
Russia 2.54 2.27 2 2 6
As one can see in Table 5.2, Germany is usually the best country, ending the game with
an average of 7.10 supply centres, winning 27 of 50 games. Russia, which is the only
country that starts with 4 supply centres, averages at only 2.54 supply centres. However,
Russia actually wins 2 of the games, while Italy never win a game, despite having an
average of 4.16 supply centres, a much higher average than Russia. Italy seems to be
the most stable country, with a standard deviation of only 1.267 supply centres. Italy
seems to behave pretty similar in each round, that is, they only move down to Tunisia
while keeping their original provinces. England also has a pretty low standard deviation,
and the common denominator for England and Italy is that their provinces are mostly
surrounded by water, hence more difficult to occupy for opponents. This can explain why
both Italy and England never become extinct in neither No emo nor All emo.
Table 5.3: Results from All emo simulations
Country Mean Std dev Median Victories Extinctions
Germany 7.22 3.388 7 23 2
Turkey 6.40 1.796 6 14 0
France 4.96 2.222 5 2 2
England 4.44 1.704 4 5 0
Austria 4.00 2.785 4 7 2
Italy 4.16 1.754 4 2 0
Russia 2.70 2.384 2 8 8
As seen in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, there are small differences between the simulations No
emo and All emo. One of the biggest differences is that Russia, despite having the lowest
average, wins as much as 8 games, compared to only winning 2 of 50 games as a regular
agent. The beginning seems to be very critical for Russia. If Russia is too aggressive and
leave its borders too open, Germany and Turkey takes advantage of this and occupies
Russia’s home provinces. Russia wins the two games where Germany is exterminated.
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Table 5.4: Example of comparison for testing of individual differences
Configuration Austria England France Germany Italy Russia Turkey
No emo
E104 Emo
Table 5.5: Results from E101 to E107 simulations
Country Config Mean Std dev Median Victories Extinctions
Turkey E101 6.37 1.542 6 8 0
France E106 4.87 2.909 5 8 3
Germany E104 4.73 3.433 5 7 4
England E107 4.63 1.377 4 1 0
Italy E103 4.50 1.480 5 0 1
Austria E102 4.33 1.807 4 1 0
Russia E105 2.00 1.597 1.5 0 5
5.1.1.1 Individual differences
To study the effects of the Emotion module for a given country, we compared two data
sets where the only difference was the country at hand was running the Emotion module
in one of the data sets, while all the other countries were controlled by regular agents
(see Table 5.4 for an example). This enabled us to compare the number of supply centres
gained by for example Germany with emotions to the number of supply centres gained
without emotions. We decided to run 30 simulations where each country played with
emotions against all the other countries without emotions (E101 through E107 in Table
5.1). Then we compared the number of supply centres for each country in the 30 first
No emo simulations to the number of supply centres the emotional agent had in E101 to
E107.
The results from E101 through E107 are presented in Table 5.5. What we notice by
comparing the results from Table 5.2 to the results in Table 5.5 is that the emotional
agents win fewer times than the regular agents (11.9% to 16.47% of the games), and they
become extinct more often (6.19% to 4.29% of the games)1.
1Bear in mind that Table 5.2 is based on 50 simulations, while 5.5 is based on 30 simulations
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5.1.1.2 Results for Turkey
Table 5.6: Emotion’s effect on performance: Turkey
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 6.33 30 1.882
E101 6.37 30 1.542
Turkey Others Mean difference Z p-value Based on
Emotion Regular −0.033 −.058 0.954 Negative ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
We conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare the number of supply centres for
Turkey with and without emotions, since only one of the data samples were normally
distributed. The results from the Wilcoxon test gave Z = −0.58 , p = 0.954 based
on negative ranks. The number of supply centres increased from 6.33 + /− 1.882 with a
regular agent to 6.37+/−1.542 with an emotional agent, meaning that Turkey performed
slightly better with emotions. Since p = 0.954 > 0.05, we can conclude that the results
were not statistically significant.
5.1.1.3 Results for Austria
Table 5.7: Emotion’s effect on performance: Austria
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 4.60 30 2.298
E102 4.33 30 1.807
Austria Others Mean difference t-value p-value
Emotion Regular 0.267 0.492 0.627
(b) Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
We conducted a paired sample t-test to compare the number of supply centres for Austria
with and without emotions, since the data for both samples were normally distributed.
The regular agent averaged 4.60 + / − 2.298 supply centres, while the emotional agent
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averaged 4.33 + / − 1.807. This means that the emotional agent performed 5.8% worse
than the regular agent. The results of the t-test was t(29) = 0.492, p = 0.627. Since p =
0.627 > 0.05, the small difference of 0.267 supply centres was not statistically significant.
5.1.1.4 Results for Italy
Table 5.8: Emotion’s effect on performance: Italy
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 4.07 30 1.172
E103 4.50 30 1.480
Italy Others Mean difference Z p-value Based on
Emotion Regular −0.433 −1.083 0.279 Negative ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
We conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare the number of supply centres for
Italy with and without emotions, since none of the data samples were normally distributed.
The results from the Wilcoxon test gave Z = −1.083 , p = 0.279 based on negative ranks.
The number of supply centres increased from 4.07 + / − 1.172 with a regular agent to
4.50+/−1.480 with an emotional agent, meaning that Italy performed 10.6% better with
emotions. Since p = 0.279 > 0.05, we can conclude that the results were not statistically
significant.
5.1.1.5 Results for Germany
Table 5.9: Emotion’s effect on performance: Germany
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 7.0 30 3.248
E104 4.73 30 3.433
Germany Others Mean difference t-value p-value
Emotion Regular 2.267 2.524 0.017
(b) Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
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We conducted a paired sample t-test to compare the number of supply centres for Germany
with and without emotions, since the data for both samples were normally distributed.
The results from the t-test gave t(29) = 2.524 , p = 0.017. The number of supply
centres decreased from 7.0 + / − 3.248 with a regular agent to 4.73 + / − 3.433 with an
emotional agent. This means that Germany plays 32.3% worse with an emotional agent
compared to playing with a regular agent. The results are statistically significant, since
p = 0.017 < 0.05.
5.1.1.6 Results for Russia
Table 5.10: Emotion’s effect on performance: Russia
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 2.97 30 2.512
E105 2.00 30 1.597
Russia Others Mean difference t-value p-value
Emotion Regular 0.967 1.672 0.105
(b) Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
We conducted a paired sample t-test to compare the number of supply centres for Russia
with and without emotions, since the data for both samples were normally distributed.
The results of the t-test gave t(29) = 1.672, p = 0.105. The regular agent averaged at
2.97 + / − 2.512 supply centres, while the emotional agent averaged at 2.00 + / − 1.597.
This means that the emotional agent performed 32.6% worse than the regular agent. Since
p = 0.105 > 0.05, the results are not statistically significant.
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5.1.1.7 Results for France
Table 5.11: Emotion’s effect on performance: France
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 4.17 30 2.534
E106 4.87 30 2.909
France Others Mean difference Z p-value Based on
Emotion Regular −0.700 −0.663 0.508 Negative ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
We conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare the number of supply centres
for France with and without emotions, since none of the data samples were normally
distributed. The results from the Wilcoxon test gave Z = −0.663 , p = 0.508 based on
negative ranks. The number of supply centres increased from 4.17+/−2.534 with a regular
agent to 4.87 + /− 2.909 with an emotional agent, meaning that France performed 16.7%
better with emotions. The results were not statistically significant, since p = 0.508 > 0.05.
5.1.1.8 Results for England
Table 5.12: Emotion’s effect on performance: England
Table 5.13: Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres for England
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 4.73 30 1.856
E107 4.63 30 1.377
Table 5.14: Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
Country Supply centres comparison
England Others Mean difference Z p-value Based on
Emotion Regular 0.100 −0.130 0.897 Positive ranks
We conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare the number of supply centres
for England with and without emotions, since none of the data samples were normally
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distributed. The results from the Wilcoxon test gave Z = −0.130 , p = 0.897 based on
positive ranks. The number of supply centres decreased from 4.73+/−1.856 with a regular
agent to 4.63 +/−1.377 with an emotional agent, meaning that England performed 2.1%
worse with emotions. The results were not statistically significant, since p = 0.897 > 0.05.
5.1.1.9 Results for all countries
Table 5.15: Emotion’s effect on performance: All countries
Table 5.16: Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean N Std. Deviation
No emo 4.84 210 2.603
E101...E107 4.49 210 2.438
Table 5.17: Paired Samples Test: Emotional agent vs Regular agent
Mean difference Z p-value Based on
0.348 −1.089 0.276 Positive ranks
Last, we conducted a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare the number of supply centres
for all countries with and without emotions, since none of the data samples were normally
distributed. The results from the Wilcoxon test gave Z = −1.089 , p = 0.276 based
on positive ranks. The regular agent has an average of 4.84 + / − 2.603 supply centres,
while the emotional agent has an average of 4.49 + /− 2.438 supply centres. This means
that based on the simulations for all countries, the agent performs 7.2% worse if it has
emotions. However, the results are not statistically significant, since p = 0.276 > 0.05.
5.1.1.10 Summary
As we can see from Table 5.18, the only statistically significant result is the change in
number of supply centres for Germany. A positive mean difference indicates that the
agent performs worse with emotions than without emotions. In other words, Germany
ends up with 2.267 fewer supply centres when controlled by an emotional agent.
5.1.2 Analysis of data simulations
To make sense of the results from the simulations, we needed more information than supply
centres and geographic position. Therefore, we analysed which emotions the different
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Table 5.18: Summary of statistical analysis
Country Config 1 Config 2 Mean difference Improvement Test Significance
Turkey No emo E101 −0.033 0, 63% Wilcoxon 0.954
Austria No emo E102 0.267 −5, 8% Paired t-test 0.627
Italy No emo E103 −0.433 10, 6% Wilcoxon 0.279
Germany No emo E104 2.267 −32, 3% Paired t-test 0.017
Russia No emo E105 0.967 −32, 6% Paired t-test 0.105
France No emo E106 −0.700 16, 7% Wilcoxon 0.508
England No emo E107 0.100 −2, 1% Wilcoxon 0.897
All No emo E101...E107 0.348 −7, 2% Wilcoxon 0.237
countries were experiencing, so all the log files containing the different emotion’s intensities
were parsed and each emotion was counted and given a score.
5.1.2.1 Counting emotion occurrences
The strongest emotion for each country was counted, and the percentages of how frequent
each emotion occurred for each country can be found in Table 5.19. Joy is the most
frequent emotion because it is general and not country specific. Thus if the joy is strong
it is probable that it has a higher value than most, or all, of the other country specific
emotions, and hence is counted up to six times. This may lead to skewed data, with joy
being overrepresented.
Table 5.19: Number of emotion occurrences
Country Joy Anger Guilt Fear Admiration No emotion
Turkey 30.4% 1.4% 1.0% 0.7% 2.9% 63.6%
Austria 41.2% 9% 1.92% 10.2% 26.2% 12.5%
Italy 23.9% 5.9% 2.1% 3.0% 6.1% 58.9%
Germany 18.2% 6.4% 2.4% 6.2% 15.5% 51.3%
Russia 4.1% 6.3% 1.3% 10.1% 8.3% 69.5%
France 36.6% 3.2% 1.2% 3.8% 8.9% 46.3%
England 52.6% 5.2% 2.6% 1.7% 3.4% 34.4%
As seen in Table 5.19, Austria is the most emotional country, feeling emotions 87.5% of
the time, while Russia and Turkey only feel emotions 30− 40% of the time. Guilt is the
rarest emotion, while joy is the most common.
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5.1.2.2 Emotion score
The score was calculated like this: If an agent was experiencing a certain emotion (e.g.
guilt) and gained a province the round afterwards, then that emotion would gain a point.
If the agent loses a province after a round of feeling the emotion, then the emotion would
lose one point. The emotion scores can be seen in Table 5.20.
Table 5.20: Emotion scores for different countries
Country Joy Anger Guilt Fear Admiration No emotion
Turkey 184 4 7 8 9 392
Austria 33 −4 4 −15 73 179
Italy −14 3 7 15 38 227
Germany 32 −18 8 −22 50 264
Russia −66 −7 −14 −43 −58 −166
France 120 −13 −2 −15 7 239
England −43 30 5 7 7 348
Table 5.21: Normalised emotion scores for different countries
Country Joy Anger Guilt Fear Admiration No emotion
Turkey 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04
Austria 0.01 −0.01 0.03 −0.02 0.04 0.21
Italy −0.01 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03
Germany 0.02 −0.03 0.03 −0.03 0.03 0.05
Russia −0.13 −0.01 −0.09 −0.03 −0.06 −0.02
France 0.04 −0.04 −0.02 −0.04 0.01 0.06
England −0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.13
Table 5.21 shows the results from Table 5.20 divided by the number of times the emotion
was experienced. Russia, which has a joy score at −0.13, loses an average of 0.13 provinces
each time it feels joy. A positive joy score indicates that the agent on average gains
provinces when it feels joy. Austria gains as much as 0.21 provinces each time it does
not feel emotion. The explanation for this is probably that most of the rounds where
Austria does not feel anything are the first rounds of the game, when it usually occupies
the unoccupied supply centres in Serbia and Romania, thus gaining several points for No
emotion.
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5.1.2.3 Analysing effect on performance for individual countries
As we see in Table 5.18, Germany performs more than 30% worse with emotions. It seems
like the same might be the case for Russia, but we could not find any significant difference
with only 30 cases, even if the mean difference was above 30%. France and Italy performs
10 − 20% better with emotions, but these results are not statistically significant either.
The other three countries perform pretty similar with emotions. The different results for
the different countries can be explained by their geographical positions.
Germany is geographically located next to many empty supply centres, indicating that
the agent often will go towards these supply centres in the early rounds. This will lead to
an early increase of joy, which will make Germany take many riskful moves the following
rounds. Riskful moves do not seem to be a good idea for Germany, since that often results
in it moving away from its home provinces. The home provinces are very crucial, since
they are a necessity to build more units, and Germany’s home provinces are close to many
neighbours, meaning that they are easily taken over by other countries. Russia averages
at 4.57 supply centres when Germany is emotional compared to 2.54 when all agents are
regular. As seen in Table 5.21, Germany performs best when it experiences the emotions
admiration and fear, while it performs the worst when it is angry. This indicates that
Germany performs best with a more defencive strategy.
Austria is located south of Germany, and is in the same situation as Germany with
borders to many opponents. However, Austria only performs 5.8% worse with emotions,
while Germany performs more than 30% worse. One of the explanations can be that
Germany has more potential to expand than Austria. When Germany is being played
by an emotional agent, Russia takes advantage of Germany’s aggressiveness and steals its
home provinces. From observing the gameplay, no country seem to cause Austria these
problems. In addition to this, Austria’s home provinces are able to support each other
and can easily squeeze out intruders to a less threatening position, because there are few
neighbouring provinces that can support an attack.
Russia begins with 4 supply centres, while all the other countries begin with 3 supply
centres. Therefore, Russia is not close to many unoccupied supply centres and will feel less
joy, since it does not gain many new provinces in the beginning. This corresponds with the
data from Table 5.19, where we see that Russia is only joyful 4.1% of the time. However,
when it is joyful, it performs bad (see Table 5.21), losing an average of 0.13 supply centers,
probably because it has a very wide border to Turkey, Austria and Germany, which is
hard to defend if it takes huge risks. It loses fewer supply centres with the defencive
emotions fear, admiration and guilt than it does when it feels joy.
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France is located west on the map, and can basically only be infiltrated through Picardy,
Burgundy and Marseille without going the sea way. France is also close to two unoccupied
supply centres (Spain and Portugal), which none of the other countries are close to. This
will lead to an early increase of joy, and therefore more risky tactics. However, taking
big risks are not necessarily a stupid idea for France, since it is hard for the enemies to
get pass France’s units and into its home provinces. This means that, unlike Russia and
Germany, it might get away with making riskful moves.
Italy is positioned in a way that makes it really hard to infiltrate it without fleets. But
at the same time, it is difficult for Italy to expand, since most of the traffic goes through
their two provinces Venice and Piedmont. Therefore it makes sense that it is able to make
more riskful moves and get away with it.
England is the only country surrounded by water on all sides. This keeps them rather
safe from intruders, since the opponents have to build fleets to attack them. However, it
also makes it difficult to expand and gain new provinces. England is the country which
feels the most joy, and the reason for that is probably that England often gains a couple
of provinces in Norway and Denmark in the early rounds and keeps them throughout the
game.
Turkey is isolated in the south east corner of the map, and all the traffic to Turkey’s
home provinces usually goes through the Black Sea and Bulgaria. It is pretty safe for
Turkey to expand aggressively, because if it fails, it can always go back and try again
without being afraid of opponents taking its home provinces.
5.1.3 User testing
In order to study research questions RQ2a and RQ2b we needed to involve users in the
tests. The participants consisted of five males and one female, aged between 23 and 31
years. All of the participants were of Norwegian nationality. Four of them had prior
experience with Diplomacy, while two had never played the game before, but all of the
players had previous experience with other computer games. The inexperienced players
were given a brief introduction to the rules and game mechanics of Diplomacy. Each
participant played 3 games of StateCraft to 1905. The participants played Austria in all
games, because of Austria’s geographic position, with many neighbouring countries. First,
they played a game against a mixture of emotional agents and regular agents (referred to
as Game 0 ) and were asked to identify exactly which emotions the agents were feeling
towards them. Then they played one game against all emotional agents (referred to as
75
Game A) and one game against all regular agents (referred to as Game B). The sequence
of Game A and B were mixed to prevent skewed results due to the players becoming better
at the game. After playing through Game A and B they were asked if they observed any
differences between the two games, and if so, which differences they found and if they
thought one of the games were more fun than the other.
5.1.4 Findings
5.1.4.1 Identifying different emotions
Table 5.22: Summary of emotion identification
Player Correct Wrong N Missed Prev. experience Probability (Correct > 0)
Player A 0 7 7 7 Yes 94.4%
Player B 0 1 1 6 Yes 20.0%
Player C 0 2 2 6 No 38.7%
Player D 0 4 4 2 Yes 39.3%
Player E 1 3 4 3 No 48.0%
Player F 1 2 3 6 Yes 55.0%
The results from Game 0, where the users tried to identify the agent’s emotions, can be
found in Table 5.22. The Correct column contains the number of emotions the player
was able to identify correctly, while Wrong contains the number of misinterpreted iden-
tifications. Correct+Wrong = N , where N is the number of emotions the user thought
he observed for all agents combined. Missed contains the number of emotions that the
agent was feeling, but the user was unable to identify correctly. Probability (Correct > 0)
contains the probability of a user identifying at least one emotion correctly by randomly
guessing N times.
When asked to identify the different emotions, only two players managed to pick an emo-
tion that the agent actually felt towards them. By this, we can conclude that players are
unable to identify what the agent is feeling, at least on such a short time frame. Another
explanation may be that the players are too focused on playing the game, especially the
inexperienced ones. However, 1/2 of the inexperienced users managed to identify an emo-
tion, while only 1/4 of the experienced users did. It is also important to point out that
the users do not know how emotions would be expressed through the actions of the agent.
Also, an agent’s aggression caused by a high joy intensity may be misinterpreted by the
users as the aggression caused by a high anger intensity. Last but not least, one might
claim that the interface between an agent and the players is too limited for the agent to
convey its emotion to the player. It is very difficult to convey an emotion through the
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Table 5.23: Summary of user tests
Player Game 0 Game A Game B Most fun
Player A 4 4 1 Game A
Player B 0 2 5 Game A
Player C 1 6 2 Game B
Player D 2 6 1 Game A
Player E 6 3 2 No difference
Player F 7 12 4 Game A
Average 3.33 5.5 2.5 Game A
orders in a board game, since the only orders a player can perform in Diplomacy are move,
hold, convoy and support. If there was a better way to communicate, like for example a
chat service, the emotions would be much easier to express.
5.1.4.2 Increasing player experience
The results from Game A and Game B, where the users played one game against all
emotional agents (Game A) and one game against all regular agents (Game B), can be seen
in Table 5.23. Four of the players thought that it was more fun to play against emotional
agents, while one player thought it was more fun to play against the regular agents.
Player E did not notice any difference between the two games. Several of the participants
mentioned that the game against emotional agents were more fun since they performed
better themselves, and therefore the game appealed to their feeling of mastering. This is
also supported by the fact that the only player who performed better against the regular
agents is the same person that found it more fun to play against the regular agents. Player
F also supported this: “Game A was more fun. Simply because I got 12 centres, but it
was the second game that was most challenging. But since I lost in the end, it was less
fun”.
When asked if they observed any differences between the two games, all participants
except from Player E thought there was a difference. Player C stated that: “Assuming
Game A had emotions, Game B felt very straightforward. Enemies never backed down
and kept pushing at all fronts”.
On average, the players end up with an average of 2.5 supply centres when they play
against regular agents compared to an average of 5.5 supply centres when they play
against emotional agents. This corresponds with the results from the data simulations,
where Germany and Russia performed far worse with emotions. Austria, which is the
country that the users played, is a neighbour to both Germany and Russia, and this can
explain why most of the players performed better against the emotional agents. One
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cannot argue that the players had become better at the game when playing against the
emotional agents, because half of the test group played against the emotional agents first.
5.1.5 Summary
The results from the data simulations show that some countries perform worse with emo-
tions. The countries that perform worse are the countries which are better off using a
more conservative approach. However, not all countries are punished for using emotions,
and some countries even perform better with emotions. The common denominator for
these countries is that their home provinces are hard to infiltrate for opposing countries.
We were able to determine that it is very difficult for a human player to identify which
emotions the agents were feeling in such a short amount of time. But even if the players
did not manage to identify the agents’ emotions, it appears that most of the partici-
pants thought it was more fun to play against agents with emotions than agents without
emotions.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation of Prisoner’s Dilemma
module
6.1 About this chapter
In this chapter we will evaluate the Prisoner’s Dilemma module. In the introduction of this
thesis we described the following research question for the Prisoner’s Dilemma module.
RQ How does the PD strategies affect the performance of the agent and player experience
in StateCraft?
This was divided into three more specific research questions:
RQ1 How do the Prisoner’s Dilemma strategies affect the performance of the agent in
terms of supply centres?
RQ2 How do the strategies affect the performance of the agent in terms of score?
RQ3 Can players make a distinction between StateCraft with and without the Prisoner’s
Dilemma module?
RQ1 and RQ2 is explored and tested in Section 6.2. Statistical analysis of data collected by
running simulations of StateCraft using various configurations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
module is used to evaluate the questions.
RQ3 is explored and tested in Section 6.3, where user testing is used as the basis of the
evaluation.
79
Table 6.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma simulation configuration
Configuration Austria England France Germany Italy Russia Turkey
All Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy
All Friedman Friedman Friedman Friedman Friedman Friedman Friedman Friedman
All TFT TFT TFT TFT TFT TFT TFT TFT
T101 TFT
T102 TFT
T103 TFT
T104 TFT
T105 TFT
T106 TFT
T107 TFT
F101 Friedman
F102 Friedman
F103 Friedman
F104 Friedman
F105 Friedman
F106 Friedman
F107 Friedman
Note that “Dummy” is removed from the configurations T101 through F107 to enhance readability.
All the data have been tested for normality, by using a Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro and
Wilk, 1965). For the normally distributed data, we used paired sample t-test (Wohlin
et al., 2000). For the data that were not normally distributed, we used Wilcoxon signed-
rank test (Wohlin et al., 2000). In all the t-tests, we use 95% confident interval.
6.2 Simulations
To evaluate how the agent performed in terms of supply centers and score, we ran a series
of simulations where all seven players were controlled by agents. As depicted in Table 6.1,
a total of 17 simulation configurations were tested. Each configuration used a different
combination of strategies for the country, where each country was configured to use the
Dummy, Friedman or Tit-For-Tat-strategy (TFT). The Dummy strategy is, as the name
implies, a placeholder for a real strategy, meaning that the term can be interpreted as the
regular agent without TFT or Friedman, used as the baseline for comparison. Using the
Dummy strategy is equivalent to not using a strategy at all, and the term Dummy will
be used interchangeably to describe simulations or a configuration where the country at
hand is not using a Prisoner’s Dilemma strategy.
80
The All Dummy, All Friedman and All TFT listings in Table 6.1 are configurations where
all the agents are using the same strategy (either Dummy, Tit-For-Tat or Friedman), while
T101-T107 and F101-F107 are configurations where only one of the agents are running the
Friedman or Tit-For-Tat strategy. The Dummy, Friedman and Tit-For-Tat configurations
were run 50 times each, while T101 through T107 and F101 through F107 were run 20
times each. Each simulated game started in Spring 1901, and lasted until Spring 1911.
A total of 430 simulated games were collected for the analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
module.
The data used for the analysis was mainly the score and number of supply centres each
country had gained in the last round (Spring 1911) of the simulations.
6.2.1 Effect on performance : mean difference
To measure the general effect on performance, we looked at the number of supply centres
each country had in the last round of the game (Spring 1911). We calculated the standard
deviation for each simulation for each country, meaning that we found how much the
average country differed from the average number of supply centres. We then used this
data to combine and calculate an average standard deviation for a given configuration,
i.e. we combined the standard deviation for each country to find the average standard
deviation for all countries running a given configuration. These numbers are presented in
Table 6.2a under the column Mean difference.
We created three such data sets: one where all agents were running the Dummy strategy
(All Dummy), one where all the agents were running the Tit-For-Tat strategy (All TFT ),
and one where all the agents were running the Friedman strategy (All Friedman).
The data sets were tested for normality, and we found that all sets were normally distri-
buted. Because of this, the sets for All TFT and All Friedman where compared with the
set for All Dummy using a paired sample t-test.
The results of this comparison is presented in Table 6.2
All Dummy versus All TFT
All Dummy vs All TFT was compared using the paired sample t-test. The countries run-
ning the Dummy strategy had an average standard deviation of 1.66, while the countries
running all TFT had an average standard deviation of 1.33. The result of the t-test sho-
wed t(49) = 5.521 , p = 0.000. This shows that the simulations where the agents are all
running the Tit-For-Tat strategy have considerably lower average standard deviation than
the simulations where the agents are all running the Dummy strategy, with a difference
of 0.331. A lower average standard deviation for a given strategy can be interpreted as a
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Table 6.2: Effect on performance: Mean difference
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Mean difference N Std. Deviation
All Dummy 1.660 50 0.474
All TFT 1.329 50 0.467
All Friedman 1.172 50 0.522
Configuration
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean t-value p-value
All Dummy All TFT 0.331 5.521 0.001
All Dummy All Friedman 0.488 3.702 0.000
(b) Paired Samples Test comparison table
more balanced game for the strategy, i.e. that the agents performs more equal using this
strategy, if all agents are using the same strategy, compared to a test where none of the
agents are using any strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We conclude that All TFT
makes the game more balanced.
All Dummy versus All Friedman
All Dummy vs All Friedman was compared in the same manner as All Dummy vs All
TFT. A paired sample t-test was used to perform the comparison between the two data
sets, and the outcome showed that the countries running All Dummy had an average
standard deviation of 1.66, while the countries running All Friedman had an average
standard deviation of 1.17. t(49) = 3.702 , p = 0.001. The results show the same trend as
for All TFT, i.e. that the strategy makes the game more balanced if all the other agents
are using Friedman, compared to a game where the agent and all the other players are
playing no strategy.
All Friedman showed an ever lower average standard deviation than All TFT, with a
difference of 0.448 compared to All Dummy.
Summary
What we found was that in a game where all the agents were running either the Tit-
For-Tat or the Friedman strategy, all the agents would perform more similar or balanced
compared to a game where all the agents were using the Dummy strategy. Figure 6.1
shows how Friedman and Tit-For-Tat leads to a more balanced game, visualised through
the average number of supply centres each country gets using the different strategies.
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(a) Dummy
(b) Tit-For-Tat
(c) Friedman
Figure 6.1: Average supply centre differences
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Table 6.3: Example of comparison for testing of individual differences
Configuration Austria England France Germany Italy Russia Turkey
All Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy
T105 TFT Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy
6.2.2 Effect on performance : individual differences
To measure the effect on performance for individual countries, we had to look at how a
individual country performed when it was the only country using a strategy, compared
with how it would perform when none of the countries were using a strategy.
We used 20 of the 50 simulations where all the countries were using the Dummy strategy
(i.e. no strategy), and for each country, we compared this to 20 simulations where only
the country at hand were running either Tit-For-Tat or Friedman, while the rest were
running Dummy. All in all, we performed 14 such comparisons, two for each country.
Table 6.3 depicts an example of how the comparison was performed, where the different
rows represents a different configuration. In the example table we can see how Austria’s
performance was compared in two configurations. We looked at the performance of Austria
when it was the only country using the Tit-For-Tat strategy versus how it performed when
none of the countries were using any strategy.
The data samples were tested for normality, and we found that the majority of the data
sets were not normally distributed. Because of this, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test was
chosen to perform the comparison. Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a type of non-parametric
test used to find differences between two related samples. It is used instead of the t-test
because it, unlike the t-test, does not assume that the samples are normally distributed.
In the tables presented below, a negative mean value implies that the tested strategy
performed better than the Dummy strategy it was compared against, while a positive
mean value implies that the Dummy strategy performs better than the tested strategy.
The tables are divided into three parts, “(a) Paired Samples Statistics”, “(b) Paired
Samples Test: supply centres” and “(c) Paired Samples Test: score”. The Paired Samples
Statistics table show how the country at hand perform individually using either Dummy,
TFT or Friedman, looking at the the number of supply centres and the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma score respectively. The two Paired Samples Test tables depicts the results from
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, that is, how the country at hand performs in terms of
supply centres and Prisoner’s Dilemma score using either TFT or Friedman, compared to
when it is using the Dummy strategy.
“Sample 1” in the two Paired Samples Test tables tables refers to the base case the country
is compared to, i.e. “All Dummy”, while “Sample 2” refers to the configuration where the
country is the only country using either Tit-For-Tat or Friedman. Sample 2 will be
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described using a single character plus three digits, e.g. F101. The letter will be either
T or F, and tells us whether the country is using Tit-For-Tat or Friedman, where Tit-
For-Tat configurations will be prefixed with the T, and Friedman will be prefixed with
the F. The digits have no importance, other than that the different simulations using e.g.
Tit-For-Tat is numbered sequentially from 1 to 7. F101 tells us that this is a configuration
where the country at hand is using the Friedman strategy, and all the other countries are
using the Dummy strategy.
6.2.2.1 Austria
The results for Austria are presented in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Effect on performance: Austria
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 4.750 20 2.049 201.000 20 66.961
TFT 3.750 20 1.386 212.450 20 64.689
Friedman 2.650 20 1.996 198.800 20 67.777
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T105 1.000 −1.583 0.113 Pos. ranks
All Dummy F101 2.100 −3.004 0.003 Pos. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T105 −11.450 −0.616 0.538 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F101 2.200 −0.149 0.881 Neg. ranks
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
Austria: supply centres
We were able to find a statistical significance for the Friedman strategy, but not for Tit-
For-Tat. Austria running the Tit-For-Tat strategy gave Z = −1.583 , p = 0.113 based on
positive ranks. The mean value for Tit-For-Tat indicates that Austria gains fewer supply
centres with Tit-For-Tat than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
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Austria running Friedman gave Z = −3.004 , p = 0.003 based on positive ranks. Due to
the direction of the mean we can conclude that there was a statistically significant decrease
in the number of supply centres for Austria using the Friedman strategy compared to
Austria using the Dummy strategy, from 4.75 + /− 2.049 to 2.650 + /− 1.996, a decrease
of 2.1.
Austria: score
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. Austria
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −0.616 , p = 0.538 based on negative ranks. The mean
value for TFT indicates that Austria performs better with Tit-For-Tat than with Dummy
in terms of score, but the difference is not significant.
Austria running Friedman gave Z = −0.149 , p = 0.881 based on negative ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that Austria using the Friedman strategy performs
worse than Austria using the Dummy strategy in terms of score, but the difference is not
significant.
6.2.2.2 England
The results for England are presented in Table 6.5.
England: supply centres
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. England
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −1.780 , p = 0.075 based on positive ranks. The mean
value for Tit-For-Tat indicates that England gains fewer supply centres with Tit-For-Tat
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
England running Friedman gave Z = −1.834 , p = 0.067 based on positive ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that England gains fewer supply centres with Friedman
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
England: score
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. England
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −1.493 , p = 0.135 based on negative ranks. The mean
value for TFT indicates that England performs better with Tit-For-Tat than with Dummy
in terms of score, but the difference is not significant.
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Table 6.5: Effects on performance: England
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 4.900 20 1.619 197.150 20 57.860
TFT 4.100 20 1.020 221.300 20 61.434
Friedman 3.900 20 1.651 206.800 20 54.878
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T103 0.800 −1.780 0.075 Pos. ranks
All Dummy F102 1.00 −1.834 0.067 Pos. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T103 −24.150 −1.493 0.135 Neg. rank
All Dummy F102 −9.650 −0.411 0.681 Neg. rank
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
England running Friedman gave Z = −0.411 , p = 0.681 based on negative ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that England using the Friedman strategy performs
better than England using the Dummy strategy in terms of score, but the difference is
not significant.
6.2.2.3 France
The results for France are presented in Table 6.6.
France: supply centres
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. France
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −0.088 , p = 0.930 based on positive ranks. The mean
value for Tit-For-Tat indicates that France gains fewer supply centres with Tit-For-Tat
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
France running Friedman gave Z = −0.878 , p = 0.380 based on positive ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that France gains fewer supply centres with Friedman
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
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Table 6.6: Effect on performance: France
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 4.150 20 2.254 225.350 20 70.906
TFT 4.050 20 2.762 214.350 20 70.434
Friedman 3.650 20 2.084 238.800 20 40.984
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T101 0.100 -0.088 0.930 Pos. ranks
All Dummy F103 0.500 −0.878 0.380 Pos. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T101 11.000 −0.299 0.765 Pos. ranks
All Dummy F103 −13.450 -0.766 0.444 Neg. ranks
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
France: score
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. France
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −0.299 , p = 0.765 based on positive ranks. The mean
value for TFT indicates that France performs worse with Tit-For-Tat than with Dummy
in terms of score, but the difference is not significant.
France running Friedman gave Z = −0.766 , p = 0.444 based on negative ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that France using the Friedman strategy performs
better than France using the Dummy strategy in terms of score, but the difference is not
significant.
6.2.2.4 Germany
The results for Germany are presented in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.7: Effect on performance: Germany
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 7.450 20 2.305 377.000 20 99.992
TFT 4.550 20 2.258 338.250 20 81.977
Friedman 3.100 20 2.149 298.800 20 73.576
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T102 2.900 −2.929 0.003 Pos. ranks
All Dummy F104 4.350 −3.731 0.000 Pos. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T102 38.750 −1.979 0.048 Pos. ranks
All Dummy F104 78.200 −2.837 0.005 Pos. ranks
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
Germany: supply centres
We were able to find a statistical significance for both Tit-For-Tat and Friedman. Germany
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −2.929 , p = 0.003 based on positive ranks. Due to the
direction of the mean we can conclude that there was a statistically significant decrease
in the number of supply centres for Germany using the Tit-For-Tat strategy compared
to Germany using the Dummy strategy, from 7.450 + / − 2.305 to 4.550 + / − 2.258, a
decrease of 2.9.
Germany running Friedman gave Z = −3.731 , p = 0.000 based on positive ranks. Due to
the direction of the mean we can conclude that there was a statistically significant decrease
in the number of supply centres for Germany using the Friedman strategy compared to
Germany using the Dummy strategy, from 7.450+/−2.305 to 3.100+/−2.149, a decrease
of 4.3.
Germany: score
We were able to find a statistical significance for both the Friedman and Tit-For-Tat
strategy. Germany running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −1.979 , p = 0.048 based on positive
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ranks. Due to the direction of the mean we can conclude that there is a statistically
significant reduction in performance in terms of score for Germany using the Tit-For-Tat
strategy compared to Germany using the Dummy strategy, from 377.000 + /− 99.992 to
338.250 + /− 81.977, a decrease of 38.75.
Germany running Friedman gave Z = −2.837 , p = 0.005 based on positive ranks. Due to
the direction of the mean we can conclude that there is a statistically significant reduction
in performance in terms of score for Germany using the Friedman strategy compared to
Germany using the Dummy strategy, from 377.000 + /− 99.992 to 298.800 + /− 73.576,
a decrease of 78.2.
6.2.2.5 Italy
The results for Italy are presented in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8: Effect on performance: Italy
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 4.150 20 1.843 200.300 20 63.952
TFT 4.600 20 2.010 228.250 20 55.45778
Friedman 4.700 20 1.592 207.700 20 40.694
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T107 −0.450 −0.790 0.430 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F105 −0.550 −0.835 0.404 Neg. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T107 −27.950 −1.736 0.083 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F105 −7.400 −1.307 0.191 Neg. ranks
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
Italy: supply centres
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. Italy
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −0.790 , p = 0.430 based on negative ranks. The mean
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value for Tit-For-Tat indicates that Italy gains more supply centres with Tit-For-Tat than
with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
Italy running Friedman gave Z = −0.835 , p = 0.404 based on negative ranks. The mean
value for Friedman indicates that Italy gains more supply centres with Friedman than
with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
Italy: score
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. Italy
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −1.736 , p = 0.083 based on negative ranks. The mean
value for TFT indicates that Italy performs better with Tit-For-Tat than with Dummy
in terms of score, but the difference is not significant.
Italy running Friedman gave Z = −1.307 , p = 0.191 based on positive ranks. The mean
value for Friedman indicates that Italy using the Friedman strategy performs better than
Italy using the Dummy strategy in terms of score, but the difference is not significant.
6.2.2.6 Russia
The results for Russia are presented in Table 6.9.
Russia: supply centres
We were able to find a statistical significance for the Tit-For-Tat strategy, but not for
Friedman. Russia running the Tit-For-Tat strategy gave Z = −2.059 , p = 0.039 based
on negative ranks. Due to the direction of the mean value we can conclude that there was
a statistically significant increase in the number of supply centres for Russia using the Tit-
For-Tat strategy compared to Russia using the Dummy strategy, from 2.500 + /− 1.433
to 3.650 + /− 1.899, an increase of 1.15.
Russia running Friedman gave Z = −1.104 , p = 0.270 based on positive ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that Russia gains fewer supply centres with Friedman
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
Russia: score
We were able to find a statistical significance for the Tit-For-Tat strategy, but not for
Friedman. Russia running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −2.240 , p = 0.025 based on negative
ranks. Due to the direction of the mean we can conclude that there is a statistically
significant increase in performance in terms of score for Russia using the Tit-For-Tat
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Table 6.9: Effect on performance: Russia
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 2.500 20 1.433 180.350 20 66.725
TFT 3.650 20 1.899 228.700 20 67.943
Friedman 2.100 20 1.916 212.550 20 67.950
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T104 −1.150 −2.059 0.039 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F106 0.400 −1.104 0.270 Pos. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T104 −48.350 −2.240 0.025 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F106 −32.200 −1.475 0.140 Neg. ranks
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
strategy compared to Russia using the Dummy strategy, from 180.350 + / − 66.752 to
228.700 + /− 67.943 , an increase of 48.350.
Russia running Friedman gave Z = −1.475 , p = 0.140 based on negative ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that Russia using the Friedman strategy performs
better than Russia using the Dummy strategy in terms of score, but the difference is not
significant.
6.2.2.7 Turkey
The results for Turkey are presented in Table 6.10.
Turkey: supply centres
We were unable to find any significance for neither Tit-For-Tat nor Friedman. Turkey
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −1.331 , p = 0.183 based on negative ranks. The mean
value for Tit-For-Tat indicates that Turkey gains more supply centres with Tit-For-Tat
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
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Table 6.10: Effect on performance: Turkey
(a) Paired Samples Statistics
Supply centres Score
Strategy Mean N Std. Deviation Mean N Std. Deviation
Dummy 5.900 20 1.483 110.050 20 51.786
TFT 6.450 20 1.848 164.550 20 62.146
Friedman 5.600 20 1.846 158.500 20 48.866
Configuration Supply centres comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T106 −0.550 −1.331 0.183 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F107 0.300 −0.373 0.709 Pos. ranks
(b) Paired Samples Test: supply centers
Configuration Score comparison
Sample 1 Sample 2 Mean difference Z p-value Based on
All Dummy T106 −54.500 −2.389 0.017 Neg. ranks
All Dummy F107 −48.450 −2.576 0.010 Neg. ranks
(c) Paired Samples Test: score
Turkey running Friedman gave Z = −0.373 , p = 0.709 based on positive ranks. The
mean value for Friedman indicates that Turkey gains fewer supply centres with Friedman
than with Dummy, but the difference is not significant.
Turkey: score
We were able to find a statistical significance for both Tit-For-Tat and Friedman. Turkey
running Tit-For-Tat gave Z = −2.389 , p = 0.017 based on negative ranks. Due to the
direction of the mean we can conclude that there is a statistically significant increase
in performance in terms of score for Turkey using the Tit-For-Tat strategy compared to
Turkey using the Dummy strategy, from 110.050 + /− 51.786 to 164.550 + /− 62.146, an
increase of 54.5.
Turkey running Friedman gave Z = −2.576 , p = 0.010 based on negative ranks. Due to
the direction of the mean we can conclude that there is a statistically significant increase
in performance in terms of score for Turkey using the Friedman strategy compared to
Turkey using the Dummy strategy, from 110.500 + /− 51.786 to 158.500 + /− 48.866, an
increase of 48.45.
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6.2.2.8 Summary
Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 summarise the findings in individual differences. The tables
show that both Friedman and Tit-For-Tat gave very few significant results. The low
number might indicate that the strategies simply do not affect the agent all that much,
but there is also a possibility that the results had been different if the data used for the
analysis (20 simulations for each configuration) had been greater.
Table 6.11: Effect on performance: Supply centers
Strategy Better Worse Sig. better Sig. worse Total sig. Total
Single TFT 3 4 1 1 2 7
Single Friedman 1 6 0 2 2 7
Table 6.12: Effect on performance: Score
Strategy Better Worse Sig. better Sig. worse Total sig. Total
Single TFT 6 1 2 1 3 7
Single Friedman 5 2 1 1 2 7
Supply centres
For supply centres, 2/7 countries showed significant effect of the strategy when using
Tit-For-Tat. 1/7 performed better and 1/7 performed worse. Looking past statistical
significance, 3/7 of the countries indicated an improvement in performance, while 4/7 of
the countries indicated a decrease in performance. Based on these findings we are unable
to give any clear conclusions for the effect of Tit-For-Tat on the performance of the agent
in terms of supply centres.
For the countries using Friedman, 2/7 countries showed significant effect of the strategy.
Both the countries showing significant effect from Friedman performed worse, indicating
that Friedman decreases the performance of the agent in terms of supply centres. The
countries performing worse, Austria and Germany, are both surrounded by enemies on all
fronts, and we assume that the reason for Friedman’s decrease in performance is related to
the fact that once Friedman is defected against, it will become a very aggressive strategy,
leading to a lack of protection for the home provinces.
Score
3/7 countries using Tit-For-Tat showed a significant effect of the strategy. 2/7 sho-
wed a significant increase in performance in terms of score, while 1/7 countries showed
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a statistical significant decrease in performance. Looking past significance, 6/7 countries
indicated an increase in performance, while 1/7 countries indicated that they performed
worse. Looking past significance, the mean value indicate that 6 of the 7 countries per-
forms better in terms of Prisoner’s Dilemma score using TFT compared to the dummy
strategy. Based on these findings, we conclude that in terms of score, the Tit-For-Tat
strategy improves the performance of the agent.
For the countries using the Friedman strategy, 2/7 countries showed significant effect of
the strategy. 1/7 performed better and 1/7 worse. These findings are too ambiguous to
make any clear conclusions to the effect of the Friedman strategy in terms of score, but
if we look at the total number of countries reporting an increase in performance (5/7)
compared to the total number of countries reporting a decrease in performance (2/7) we
get a clear indication that Friedman increases the performance of the agent in terms of
score.
6.3 User testing
To evaluate the third research question, “Can players make a distinction between Sta-
teCraft with and without the Prisoner’s Dilemma module?”, we gathered six persons to
participate in a user testing of the game. Every participant received a document that
explained the purpose of the test, and they were given a short introduction to Diplo-
macy, StateCraft and the user interface of StateCraft before they started their tests. The
introduction was performed partly by us, and partly by letting the participants try for
themselves.
Five of the participants were male, one was female1. All participants were in their twen-
ties and were pursuing higher education in computers. Five of the participants were of
Norwegian nationality while one was Spanish. Three of the participants had played Di-
plomacy and / or StateCraft before, while three had no experience with either game.
All participants had played computer games before, but not everyone had experience
with computerised war games (one participant stated that his only prior experience with
computer games was limited to games such as Othello, Patience and The Sims).
Each participant was asked to play two games: Game A where all the opponents were
controlled by agents using the Dummy strategy, and Game B where three of the agents
used Tit-For-Tat and three used the Friedman strategy. Both games lasted from Spring
1901 until Spring 1905. The sequence the games were played in was mixed - three of the
participants played Game A before Game B, and three of the participants played Game
B before Game A.
1Note that all participants will be referred to using the male gender to obfuscate the gender of the
participants.
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After playing the games, they were asked to answer three questions:
1. did they observe any differences between the two games
2. which of the two games was more fun
3. which of the opponents used which strategy in Game B
6.3.1 Findings
Differences between the two games were easy to identify for most of the partici-
pants. Many reported that the agent was more aggressive in Game A, something which
is reflected by the higher average number of supply centres the participants was able to
gain in Game B. Table 6.13 lists the number of supply centres the different participants
was able to gain by Spring 1905 for both games played. The average number of supply
centres gained by Spring 1905 for Game A is 4, 5 compared to the average of 6.0 for Game
B. This is a good indicator that the introduction of Tit-For-Tat and Friedman makes the
agent less aggressive.
However, not everyone reported that the agents were more aggressive in Game B. One
of our participants stated that “The countries were better in Game B. More aggressive”.
Three users stated that they found specific countries to be more aggressive in Game
B, something which might be the result of a defection performed by the player, which
would lead both Tit-For-Tat and Friedman to retaliate by attacking the player. However,
all countries mentioned as more aggressive in Game B were countries directly adjacent
to the user, something we think might be caused by limited visibility in the game by
inexperienced users (i.e. players might not be able to interpret the actions performed on
the other side of the map as they are concentrating on the actions performed in close
proximity to the players’ units).
All participants reported that they found some difference between Game A and Game
B. Most comments referred to the aggressiveness of the agent, either that some country
was acting more aggressive in one of the games, or that the game in general was more
aggressive, something we interpret as that all the countries or some unspecified set of
countries were acting more aggressive.
When asked which of the games they preferred half of the participants preferred
Game A, and half of the participants preferred Game B.
A general trend seems to be that those that preferred Game A also described it as more
challenging. This corresponds to the performance of the users preferring Game A, as all
the users preferring Game A also gained a lower number of supply centres in Game A
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Table 6.13: Participant performance and preferred game
Participant Previous experience
Number of
supply centres
in Game A
Number of
supply centres
in Game B Most fun
Participant 1 No 6 7 Game B
Participant 2 Yes 4 6 Game A
Participant 3 Yes 8 4 Game B
Participant 4 No 4 7 Game B
Participant 5 Yes 1 7 Game A
Participant 6 No 4 5 Game A
Average - 4.5 6.0 -
compared to Game B. Although not very clear, this could indicate that the users preferring
Game A found it more fun because it was more challenging.
One participant, Participant 2, reported that he preferred Game A because it was easier
than Game B, even though he performed worse in Game A than in Game B. This seems
strange, but might be explained by his comment about “stupid” actions performed by
the agents: “In Game A, they kept doing the same stuff all over again without support”.
Scott (2002) argues that AI developers sometimes should focus on creating the Illusion
of intelligence rather than making the AI always perform the heuristically determined
best moves. Maybe an agent which keeps repeating its actions, a very non-human like
behaviour, might give the users the impression that the agent is actually stupid and thus
a less worthy opponent.
Participant 1 and Participant 3, two of the participants that preferred Game B over
Game A, both played Game A before Game B. Participant 1 did not give any reason
for his preference, while Participant 3 stated that Game B contained more excitement
and fewer situations where the agents performed the same action over and over, resulting
in “never-ending” standoff situations. However, due to the small data set from the user
testing we cannot rule out that the preference might be caused by a better understanding
of StateCraft due to more experience with the game after playing the same country in
Game A.
The third participant who played Game B before Game A answered that B was more fun
because he “got to rule the world”, indicating that at least for this participant, the game
was more fun because the agent was performing worse.
When asked to identify which strategies the agents used few users managed to
identify which strategy the different countries were using. Table 6.15a shows the partici-
pants’ take on which strategy each country was using, where the numbers represents how
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many users that thought the country was using that particular strategy, e.g. two users
thought England was using TFT. Table 6.15b shows which strategy the different country
was actually using.
Table 6.14: Strategy configuration and participants’ guesses
Country TFT Friedman None
England 2 2 2
Turkey 3 2 1
France 1 1 4
Italy 2 4
Austria 1 2 3
Germany 3 1 2
(a) Participants’ take on which strategy each country
was using
Country TFT Friedman None
England x
Turkey x
France x
Italy x
Austria x
Germany x
(b) Strategy actually used by the different coun-
tries
As the tables show, England, Turkey and Austria was identified correctly by 33.3% of the
participants, France by 16.7%, Italy by 0%, and Germany by 50%. This tells us that it
is hard to identify which strategy each country is using, something that corresponds with
the written feedback from the users: they really didn’t know what was going on other
than that some countries acted more or less aggressive than other countries.
This isn’t all that surprising. We suspect that users need both much experience with
the old agent in StateCraft as well as thorough knowledge about the strategies to be
able to separate Tit-For-Tat and Friedman from the Dummy strategy. There is also
the possibility that due to the short duration of the games (four years), the users did
not have time to study the two games as thoroughly as needed to find any substantial
or pronounced differences between the different agents, and thus could not identify the
different strategies correctly.
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6.3.2 Summary
The results from the user tests are inconclusive. All the participants reported some
difference between the two games, either that Game A or some of the agents in Game A
was more aggressive than the ones in Game B, or vice versa, that Game B or some of the
agents in Game B was more aggressive than the ones in Game A.
We were unable to determine which game the users preferred. Half the participants pre-
ferred Game A (without other strategies than the Dummy, which only performs logging),
while half the participants preferred Game B.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
The main objective of the thesis was to study whether we could improve the player’s
experience by modifying the autonomous agent in StateCraft. The modifications were
implemented as two separate modules, the Emotion module and the Prisoners’s Dilemma
module. We also wished to study how our modifications affected the agent’s performance
in terms of supply centers, and whether or not strategies used for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
could be used in a n-player game such as StateCraft.
The Emotion module tries to improve the user’s experience of the game by giving the
autonomous agent in StateCraft emotions. The emotions affect the decision making of
the agent with the intention of making it appear more human-like.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma module was created to give the autonomous agent in StateCraft
an understanding of the concept of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. StateCraft contains several
situations similar to the ones expressed in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we wished to study
whether the agent would perform differently if it understood this concept. The module
was implemented with two strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma module, Tit-For-Tat
and Freidman, which both modify the behaviour of the agent according to the original
specification of the strategies.
7.1.1 Performance
The effects the Emotion module and the Prisoner’s Dilemma module had on agent per-
formance were measured using statistical analysis on data collected from simulations of
the game using different configurations.
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7.1.1.1 Emotion module
The results show that the Emotion module decreases the performance of the agent in
terms of supply centres in general. We were unable to find significant differences between
the regular agent and the agent using the Emotion module for all countries except for
Germany. Germany performs significantly worse with emotions. Due to its close proximity
to neighbouring enemies, it becomes vulnerable if it takes unnecessary risks in the game.
The feeling of joy leads to the agent taking risky decisions, and because Germany will
most likely occupy the neutral provinces in the early rounds of the game, which leads to
the feeling of joy, it becomes joyful and perform bold moves.
However, we cannot conclude that the agent performs worse using emotions because we
have so few significant findings. This could be caused by the limited amount of data
we collected during the data simulations, and we suggest that given enough data, more
countries would give significant results.
7.1.1.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma module
The results for the Prisoner’s Dilemma are two-fold. For Tit-For-Tat, we found a signi-
ficant effect of the strategy for two countries. One performed better, while the other
performed worse. Because of these results, we cannot conclude either way. Looking past
significance, we find that four of the seven countries showed a decrease in performance
based on mean values, while three of the seven countries showed an increase in perfor-
mance using Tit-For-Tat. Needless to say, these results are too ambiguous to make any
clear conclusions.
For Freidman, the results are clearer. Two of the seven countries performed worse using
Freidman. These countries, Austria and Germany, are both surrounded by enemies on all
fronts, and we assume that the reason for Freidman’s decrease in performance is related to
the fact that once Friedman is defected against, it will become a very aggressive strategy,
leading to a lack of protection for the home provinces.
However, if all the agents are running either Freidman or Tit-For-Tat, the results are
quite different. What we found was that in a game where all the agents were running
either the Tit-For-Tat or the Freidman strategy, all the agents would perform more similar
or balanced compared to a game where all the agents were using the Dummy strategy.
Therefore, we conclude that Tit-For-Tat and Freidman will lead to a more balanced game
if all the agents are using the same strategy.
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7.1.1.3 2- and 3-player IPD strategies in n-player game
The effects the Prisoner’s Dilemma module had on performance in terms of Prisoner’s
Dilemma score were measured using statistical analysis on data collected by running
simulations of the game. The results for Tit-For-Tat show that 3/7 countries had a signi-
ficant effect of the strategy, where 2/7 countries increased their score, and 1/7 decreased
their score. Looking past significance, 6/7 countries perform better in terms of score when
using the TFT strategy.
For Freidman, the results are somewhat more ambiguous, but still give a clear indication.
2/7 countries performed significantly different when using the Freidman strategy compared
to using the regular agent. 1/7 performed worse, 1/7 performed better. In terms of mean
value, 5/7 countries performs better using the Freidman strategy.
Based on these results we conclude that both Tit-For-Tat and the Freidman strategy are
suitable for the domain of StateCraft.
7.1.2 User experience
To evaluate the user experience we conducted a user test where the participants were
asked to play StateCraft with and without our modifications enabled. The users were not
informed whether or not the modifications were present during the games, which means
that they were participating in a blind experiment. They were then asked a series of
questions, tailored with the intention of studying whether the user experience increased
or decreased as a result of our modifications.
7.1.2.1 Emotion module
When asked to identify the agents’ internal emotional states, the participants were unable
to correctly identify the emotions. There may be several reasons for this.
1. The time span used for testing was too short
2. The interface between the agent and the user is too limited
3. StateCraft provides the players with a limited set of actions (e.g. move, hold, support
and convoy)
4. The users have limited knowledge about emotions and how they affect decisions
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When asked which of the games were most fun, 4/5 of the players who noticed a dif-
ference1 between the two games found it more enjoyable to play against the emotional
agents. However, the players also performed much better against the emotional agents,
and because of this we cannot conclude whether the participants had more fun as a result
of the agent being emotional or as a result of the agent performing worse.
Based on the limited study performed we cannot make a clear conclusion on the user
experience, but the results indicate that the Emotion module increases the user experience.
7.1.2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma module
The results from the user testing for the Prisoner’s Dilemma module were unclear.
When asked to identify differences between the two games, all the participants reported
some differences between the game where all opponents were controlled by regular agents,
and the game where three of the opponents used the Freidman strategy and three of the
opponents used the Tit-For-Tat strategy. However, the differences reported by the users
were most often related to a more aggressive style by the regular agent, indicating that the
user perceives the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a defensive addition to the agent. When asked
which strategy the different countries were using, the users were unable to identify the
strategies. This leads us to believe that the participants’ limited knowledge of both the
original agent and how the strategies affect the agent is a limiting factor when it comes to
identify this particular addition, and that the time span used for testing the two games
was much too short. We conclude that the users are able to distinguish the two games,
but in most cases unable to identify which strategy the different countries are utilising.
The participants were divided in terms of which game they preferred. 3/6 users preferred
the game using the regular agent, while 3/6 users preferred the game with the Prisoner’s
Dilemma module. Because of this, we cannot conclude either way, suggesting that more
research is required.
7.2 Future work
7.2.1 TacticTree
The TacticTree was implemented to combat performance issues related to generating
tactics for the agent in StateCraft. It succeeded in doing so, but there is still room for
improvement. The agent is still having difficulties in coping with more than 11 units,
because the number of possible tactics is very large. We therefore propose that future
1Not all users were able to identify differences between the emotional agent and the regular agent
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implementations of the TacticTree should have an upper limit of for example 1000 tactics.
However, since the current TacticTree is generated by an algorithm utilising a depth-
first approach, it is difficult to implement such a limit without diminishing heterogeneity
among the tactics. The reason is that such a limit will potentially exclude the entire right
side of the TacticTree if the number of potential legal tactics is far greater than the limit,
thus reducing the variance. Therefore, we propose to generate the TacticTree by using a
breadth-first approach. This would make it possible to discard for example 80% of the
tactics without necessarily reducing variance.
7.2.2 Emotion module
In order to obtain more significant differences between the emotional agent and the regular
agent, we need to run more data simulations, especially for countries such as Russia, where
it seems likely that we would obtain a significant difference.
As our results from the user testing only gave indications that playing against emotional
agents is more fun, we suggest that it should be tested on both more experienced users
and users in general. It would also be interesting to research if the preference of playing
against emotional agents is a result of the agents performing worse, or a result of the
agents appearing more human-like.
We have concluded that it is difficult for the agents in StateCraft to express their inner
emotional state through actions only. Therefore, we propose using emoticons2 for ex-
pressing the agents’ emotional state towards the player (e.g. when the agent controlling
Russia is angry at the player, an icon of an angry face would appear next to the flag of
Russia) and study whether this improves the user’s game experience.
7.2.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
The most obvious addition to the Prisoner’s Dilemma module is the inclusion of other
strategies. Several strategies have proved to be good for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and we
have only implemented two of them in this thesis.
We defined dilemma provinces as empty provinces adjacent to provinces with supply
centres, where two or more units were able to invade the province at the same time. Ho-
wever, one can argue that dilemma provinces could be defined differently. Although our
preliminary testing has not provided us with conclusive results , it could be interesting to
perform extensive testing in a game where the dilemma provinces are defined as unoccu-
pied provinces with supply centres, where two or more enemies are adjacent and able to
2An emoticon here refers to a graphical icon representing the agent’s facial expression or mood
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invade. Therefore, we propose that such a test would be a good topic for further research
on Prisoner’s Dilemma in StateCraft.
Additionally, because of the somewhat vague results from both the user testing and the
analysis performed on the data collected from the simulations, we believe that there
would be more significant results if we had had more data to run the analysis on, and
more experienced users to perform the user testing. Hence we propose more testing and
analysis of the current Prisoner’s Dilemma module as a good focus for further research.
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Appendix A
Emotions user questionnaire
Emotion user testing
Participant
Age
Nationality
Country played
The Emotion module is an addition to StateCraft which tries to“give”the agents emotions.
First, you will play against some emotional agents and some regular agents (without
emotion). Then you will be asked to identify which agents had emotions and which
emotions they expressed.
Then you will be asked to play two different versions of the game. One is the old version
with regular agents, and one is the new version against emotional agents.
1. Can you identify which agents had emotion and which emotions they felt?
Country/Emotion Joy Anger Guilt Admiration Fear
England
Turkey
France
Italy
Austria
Russia
Germany
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2. Did you observere any difference between Game A and Game B?
(a) Which differences did you find?
(b) Do you think one of the games were more fun than the other? Elaborate.
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Appendix B
Prisoner’s Dilemma user
questionnaire
Prisoner’s Dilemma user testing
Participant
Age
Nationality
Country played
The Prisoner’s Dilemma module is an addition to StateCraft which tries to give the
computer player an understanding of cooperation and revenge, and includes two strategies
that changes the game somewhat.
You will be asked to play two different versions of the game, Game A and Game B. One is
the old version without the Prisoner’s Dilemma module, and one is the new version using
the Prisoner’s Dilemma module.
There are two different strategies for the computer players in this game. Each of these
strategies will make the players perform somewhat different:
• The Tit-For-Tat (TFT) strategy will, once “attacked”, respond by attacking the
attacker once, and then go on as if nothing happened
• The Freidman strategy will, once attacked, continue to attack every opponent in the
game until it either wins the game or is killed
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• In addition to these, the computer players can use the “no-strategy”, which is, as
the name implies, no strategy.
1. Did you observere any difference between Game A and Game B?
(a) Which differences did you find? Elaborate
(b) Was there any country that distinguished itself, or you felt acted differently
from the rest? Elaborate.
2. Which was more fun, game A or Game B? Why?
3. Can you identify which country played which strategy (TFT, Freidman, none)?
Country/Emotion TFT Freidman None
England
Turkey
France
Italy
Austria
Russia
Germany
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